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ELSPETH GUILD Coast Guard which would be funded and supported by the EU and Member States on condition of carrying out this role for them (paras 157 et seg.). The communication evidences the first prong of the 2” policy in great depth. It includes tables of the NGO boats which were deployed in the Mediterranean and the strategy used, primarily in Italy, to prevent them from carrying out search and rescue. The first NGO boats to start search and rescue were operated by the Migrant Offshore Aid Station and Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF). They commenced their activities in 2015 and were joined by 10 other NGO boats by the peak in 2017. These boats accounted for at first a quarter, then a third of all rescues at sea by the beginning of 2017 (paras 164). However, by 2017, according to the communication, EU authorities sought to discredit the NGOs in the media and popular press. Specific examples are provided from official documents (paras 167176). This approach was accompanied by Italian prosecutors commencing a series of criminal charges against captains and crew of the NGO ships accompanied by seizure of the assets (paras 185 et seq). These efforts were followed by a series of similar actions commenced in Spain and Malta in 2018 — most of which would be discontinued or dismissed by the courts. The communication includes a schedule of 13 criminal procedures commenced against NGOs carrying out search and rescue at sea (para 201). It notes that 89 people were investigated or prosecuted in 2018 for assisting people seeking to cross borders compared to 20 such prosecutions in 2017 (para 202). Gradually, all of the NGO ships carrying our search and rescue in the Mediterranean were put out of commission, seized by EU state authorities or their operations otherwise made impossible. According to the communication, the second prong would consist of installing the Libyan Coast Guard (LYCG) as the dominant actor in the Central Mediterranean (para 208). Here the allegations against EU and Member State officials are particularly severe. The (recognised) Libyan authorities, as noted above, did not give carte blanche to the EU military operation to carry out its own actions in Libyan waters (also see para 209). The LYCG carried out EU policy, also by preventing NGO search and rescue ships from entering Libyan waters while failing to take on the task of search and rescue themselves (paras 210 et seq). Already by January 2016, according to public documents referenced in the communication, Operation Sophia’s political leaders were pushing to find a way to encourage the LYCG to take responsibility for preventing people from leaving their country in search of international protection on the other side of the Mediterranean. The strategy which was followed included funding the LYCG both in terms of assets, including non-lethal military equipment, training, technical and financial assistance (para 244). Yet, the LYCG was only nominally under the authority of the recognised government of Libya and some EU states (like Italy) were also in discussions with the Libyan rebels (under the control of Khalifa Haftar) about « 82 «
