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Coast Guard which would be funded and supported by the EU and Member States
on condition of carrying out this role for them (paras 157 et seg.).
The communication evidences the first prong of the 2” policy in great depth.
It includes tables of the NGO boats which were deployed in the Mediterranean
and the strategy used, primarily in Italy, to prevent them from carrying out search
and rescue. The first NGO boats to start search and rescue were operated by
the Migrant Offshore Aid Station and Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF). They
commenced their activities in 2015 and were joined by 10 other NGO boats by
the peak in 2017. These boats accounted for at first a quarter, then a third of all
rescues at sea by the beginning of 2017 (paras 164). However, by 2017, according to
the communication, EU authorities sought to discredit the NGOs in the media and
popular press. Specific examples are provided from official documents (paras 167¬
176). This approach was accompanied by Italian prosecutors commencing a series
of criminal charges against captains and crew of the NGO ships accompanied by
seizure of the assets (paras 185 et seq). These efforts were followed by a series of
similar actions commenced in Spain and Malta in 2018 — most of which would be
discontinued or dismissed by the courts. The communication includes a schedule of
13 criminal procedures commenced against NGOs carrying out search and rescue
at sea (para 201). It notes that 89 people were investigated or prosecuted in 2018
for assisting people seeking to cross borders compared to 20 such prosecutions in
2017 (para 202). Gradually, all of the NGO ships carrying our search and rescue
in the Mediterranean were put out of commission, seized by EU state authorities
or their operations otherwise made impossible.
According to the communication, the second prong would consist of
installing the Libyan Coast Guard (LYCG) as the dominant actor in the Central
Mediterranean (para 208). Here the allegations against EU and Member State
officials are particularly severe. The (recognised) Libyan authorities, as noted above,
did not give carte blanche to the EU military operation to carry out its own actions
in Libyan waters (also see para 209). The LYCG carried out EU policy, also by
preventing NGO search and rescue ships from entering Libyan waters while failing
to take on the task of search and rescue themselves (paras 210 et seq). Already by
January 2016, according to public documents referenced in the communication,
Operation Sophia’s political leaders were pushing to find a way to encourage the
LYCG to take responsibility for preventing people from leaving their country
in search of international protection on the other side of the Mediterranean.
The strategy which was followed included funding the LYCG both in terms of
assets, including non-lethal military equipment, training, technical and financial
assistance (para 244). Yet, the LYCG was only nominally under the authority of
the recognised government of Libya and some EU states (like Italy) were also in
discussions with the Libyan rebels (under the control of Khalifa Haftar) about
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