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112 | THe Putosopuy or Eco-PoLıtics
whether Mill’s criterion can be applied to activities held to be basically
useful that transform nature and, primarily, whether the formula justifies
the principle of ecological precaution. Mill did not specify who the
others are whom we must not obstruct “in pursuing their own good in
their own way”!°’. We can therefore remedy this gap with the previously
quoted statement of another famous utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham, that
the question is not whether those in question are capable of thought and
speech but whether they are capable of suffering. And here we have
already the justification of a radically animal and environmentally
friendly politics, on a strictly liberal basis.
In one of his studies, Marius de Geus takes the striking differences
between the two liberal traditions traceable to Locke and Mill. These
make it possible to understand the mixed reception of ecological aims
on the part of the liberals: for one, the happiness principle means selfish
individualism; for the other, the service of others’ happiness. One
proclaims power over nature; the other has compassion over the non¬
human beings forced out of their habitat, killed or tortured by man. For
one, wellbeing means above all the enjoyment and possession of material
goods; for the other, intellectual goods and the distinction between
higher and lower pleasures. Accordingly, one is in favour of unlimited
growth and the other seeks the right measure and believes in a durable
economy. One rejects any limits on individual freedom; the other
supplements this with the mutual ban on doing harm."
Contemporary mainstream liberalism is closer to the views of Locke
and holds that legal protection is due at most to the individual’s right
to a healthy environment — derived from basic human rights, on the
pattern of social rights. Those who think in this way prefer to appeal to
procedural law, the strength of the liberal state, in cases where
environmental interests clash with other interests. It is true that
liberalism appears more suited to the public representation of ecological
values and interests than any other theory of government. It is, however,
unsuited for actually enforcing what it represents. The neutral state
would no longer be what it is, were it to recognise that these values and
interests can outweigh others. The true political-economic relations of
power in practice exclude the possibility of this conviction attaining
predominance. The mysterious glass ceiling is thus formed, which, in a
seemingly ununderstandable way, imposes severe limits on the behaviour
100 bid. p.16.
101 Marius de Geus: Sustainability, Liberalism, Liberal Democracy. In John Barry, Marcel
Wissenburg eds: Sustaining Liberal Democracy. Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001.