Page 160 [160]
158 | Zsolt Nagy, Zoltán Simon, Viktor Szép, and Tamás Dezső Ziegler
decide and to act without depending on the capabilities of third parties. (European
Commission 2013)
The same year, the European Council also highlighted this term by declaring
that strengthening Europes industrial and technological potential in the field
of defence would enhance its strategic autonomy (European Council 2013).
The next and a decisive milestone in the evolution of the concept was the
publication, in 2016, of the EUs new Global Strategy (EUGS). Ihe EUGS
painted a rather dire picture and raised existential guestions about the Unions
future. This was not only because the document was brought out by High
Representative Federica Mogherini in the wake of the United Kingdom's Brexit
referendum, but also because it reflected fundamental changes in Europe's
security environment, which called for a realistic reassessment of the EU’s
interests and priorities.
One of the key statements in the document emphasised that “an appropriate
level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to
foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders” (European
Union 2016, 9). This placed the term in the centre of debates about the
EU’s role in the world. In parallel, alternative terminologies also started to
proliferate, such as strategic independence, open strategic autonomy, strategic
sovereignty, or European sovereignty, to mention just a few.
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that a dynamically growing
literature attempts to shed light on the meaning, purpose, and perspectives
of European strategic autonomy. As we have seen, the concept derived
from the security and defence domain, and has filtered into other policy
areas. Nevertheless, as security and defence still remain critical elements
to strengthen the EU’s the EU’s strategic autonomy, the development of
adequate military capabilities by European states continues to be perceived
by many as the most pressing need (e.g. Zandee et al. 2020). Frédéric Mauro
goes even further by stating that strategic autonomy should explicitly be
confined to the military sphere, otherwise it will only lead to confusion. In
his view, this concept is no more and no less than the ability “to wage a war
alone” (Mauro 2018).
When it comes to the definition of strategic autonomy, one of the most
compelling definitions claims that it is “the ability of European states to set
their own priorities and make their own decisions in matters of foreign policy,
security and defence, and have the means to implement these decisions alone,
or with partners if they so choose” (Jarvenpaa et al. 2019). This interpretation
contains all the elements that are common in many analyses describing the
concept as an “ability”, which is linked to “own decisions and means” and
the possibility to act in “partnership” when necessary.
One may also notice that the standard terminology is "European strategic
autonomy, while EU documents refer to EU’ strategic autonomy. It is obvious
that European strategic autonomy, if we understand it literally, is broader