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Some argue that the ideas of European strategic autonomy and sovereignty
are vague partly by design, as they are meant to inspire, while deliberately
leaving room for interpretation (Franke and Varma 2019, 10-11). Others see
their ambiguity as allowing national governments - and citizens, we should
add - to “project their hopes and fears” into these concepts (Tamma 2020).
Indeed, it might be fair to claim that European strategic sovereignty
is, in many ways, more a matter of imagination than of hard facts and
reality today. The problem with this is that in times of political malaise,
public imagination tends to move into pessimistic, reactive, defensive,
isolationist, and protectionist, instead of optimistic, proactive, constructive,
and cooperative directions, increasing the risks of internal and external
tensions and conflicts.
Vagueness also paves the way for confusion. A recent survey by the European
Council on Foreign Relations shows that core components of the concept
of European strategic autonomy remain unclear and contentious across the
Member States (Franke and Varma 2019, 4). This haziness reinforces existing
fears, and even creates new ones, such as the concerns about weakening
transatlantic ties — felt and voiced in Central and Eastern Europe in particular
— or Young’s ‘strategic autonomy trap; for example.
This, in turn, reminds us that EU strategic sovereignty requires strong
internal (social) and external political legitimacy alike (Lippert et al. 2019,
14-15), with these two conditions being closely intertwined. Therefore, we
may also agree with Fiott that the concept of strategic sovereignty is inherently
linked to matters of political authority and to the relations between citizens,
states, and institutions (Fiott 2021c). In the same spirit, we may share Grevis
conclusion that the debate about strategic sovereignty is ultimately one
about the EU’s political cohesion (Grevi 2019, 9), with a direct impact on
its external status and behaviour.
This chapter does not aim to deliver another comprehensive account of
the idea of European strategic sovereignty. Its authors are fully conscious
that the scope of this concept extends much beyond the realm of EU external
policies — including, for instance, economic, energy, digital, industrial,
agricultural, or public health issues (see e.g. Council of the EU 2021; Tocci
2021). However, our focus remains limited to the main theme ofthis book, as
described in its Introduction, from three specific external policy perspectives
— the viewpoints of the Union’s security and defence, international trade,
and sanctions policies - as three distinctive angles of different nature in
these debates.