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78 | Zoltán Simon and Tamás Dezső Ziegler shows that individual and collective choices shaping demographic dynamics are often based on culture, tradition, value, or identity, rather than economic calculation. This may also be one reason, by the way, why government policies aimed at shaping these trends usually give limited results. Demographic developments are also a source of political turbulences. They certainly contribute to the contemporary European political malaise, nurturing the politics of fear and - due to a lack of a proper understanding of the laws of demography and thus the inability to properly frame perceived or imagined demographic challenges —- also the more diffuse politics of anxiety (see the introductory chapter of this book). Another, sometimes underestimated, implication is the potential emergence of intergenerational tensions due to the growing demographic weight, and consequently political influence, of elderly populations. Some researchers praise the stabilising and moderating effects of mature societies. However, this also has a flip side: stability may come at the expense of political flexibility and innovation, reducing the capacity to adapt to internal and external change. This brings us to Livi-Bacci’s point on the transformation of social norms and behaviours, which we have largely ignored so far and are not in a position to discuss in detail here. However, the changing role, size, and forms of the family across Europe cannot be disregarded, also because it has recently become a frequent topic in political debates in some countries - in Central and Eastern Europe in particular, also in the context of rising identity politics in the region and beyond. Current demographic trends have the negative potential of deepening the cleavages between Western and Eastern societies in our continent, and between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States in the European Union. Central and Eastern Europe, home to the world’s fastest shrinking and a rapidly ageing population, is in a particularly vulnerable situation. As Berend concludes, [allthough the turn-of-the century demographic changes in the region are not unique and equally characterize the entire European continent, it may have a more devastating impact on Central and Eastern Europe ... The rapidly aging population may further sap the fragile welfare institutions, thus endangering social stabilization and providing greater room for populism ... Countries of the region with historically developed and traditionally strong nationalism and xenophobia might not be able to handle a massive inflow of immigrant labor, if it is needed, which is a difficult problem even for well-established democracies. In other words, the same demographic trends may cause more severe problems in transforming Central and Eastern Europe than in the Western member countries of the European Union. (Berend 2009, 225-226) Last but not least, we cannot forget that the European demography also has global implications. Experts voice diverging views about the role of demographic trends in global (power) relations. For many, population size and composition are fundamental factors in shaping world order. Others find
