A deeper understanding of the decision-making mechanism may bring us closer to
the mitigation or elimination of incidental injustices or inequalities. Generally, there
are two main types of decision-making mechanisms: one starting from the grass roots,
bottom-up; the other top down (Fig. 4). The emergence of environmental injustices
can also be interpreted via this analogy. In the case of top-down, exogenous (of external
origin) injustice, the unjust situation evolves as an outcome of a process controlled
from above. As a result of a decision or series of decisions concerning the environment,
differences between geographical units may emerge. This approach infers injustice
from the given level of socio-economic developments and from the deliberate or
unintentional differentiating practice of state legislation. In Bullard’s view, this is an
institutionalized form by which certain social groups use their prejudices and power
to the detriment of other groups (Bullard 1990). This is an accidental or conscious
outcome of the functioning legal, cultural, religious, educational, economic,
environmental, military and social systems. There are currently several debates about
the intentionally racist and discriminative instances of environmental injustice, but
both environmental racism and environmental discrimination can prevail in the case
of top-down decision-making. It is undeniable that environmental harms have a
stronger effect on those unable to change their situation for lack of money or political
advocacy. These social groups undoubtedly belong to the minorities or to basically
marginalized social positions. An apt example of the top-down type of environmental
injustice is the above-mentioned story of the burial of toxic waste in Warren county,
where without any social consultation, the population was exposed to
disproportionately large environmental and health risks (Fig. 4/A).
Environmental injustice may also be rooted in the other process which builds
the decisions from the bottom up. In this case, the local factors, actors and events
also exert an influence on a higher geographical level. In certain instances, affluent
or well-connected local communities have the ability to shape not only their own
development but also indirectly influence the development of surrounding regions
in ways that serve their political interests. Their greater financial resources and
lobbying capabilities can lead to decisions that favor their interests, potentially
impacting the broader community's development trajectory. In this case, the greater
ability to assert the interests of a locality might disadvantage another geographical
unit. In spite of the fact that the process seemingly satisfies the grassroots
organization of subsidiarity, the excessive influence of regional capital overrides
actual partnership. The interests of the more influential, sometimes more affluent
populations are satisfied ahead of the needs of the “weaker” ones. Harvey calls this
process an urbanization of injustice(Harvey 1996). It may be defined as bottom-up,
endogenous (internally rooted) environmental injustice. The issue of traffic
organization may serve as an illustrative example. The growing motorization of
the present age has boosted automobile stock, and road traffic in parallel. Those
who have moved out into the urban area of Budapest tend to choose individual
travel means rather than public transport, which burdens those who live along the
commuting routes with disproportionately large noise-, vibration-, and air
pollution. This is a source of conflicts involving the leaders of the settlements, the
commuters and those residents who do not commute. A restriction on commuting
would undoubtedly be a rational equitable decision for the disadvantaged , but at
the time of writing, this decision appears unlikely. Exposure to traffic-generated
harm is thus a typical example of environmental injustice (fig. 4/B).