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A Few Worbs ON GLOBAL OVERPOPULATION 169
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Financial support for families, as percentage of GDP
Figure 2. The part of GDP earmarked for family support and fertility rate
in OECD countries, 2017. Source of data: Our World in Data (fertility), https://
data/pecd/org (expenditure)
From the perspective of overpopulation, a restrictive demographic policy may have
an important role. We must again differentiate the measures that can be taken by
democratic establishments from those introduced by totalitarian regimes. The
means of democracies to directly interfere are relatively limited: educational
programs, access to the instruments of family planning, degressive supporting
policies. Indirect means, first of all the extension of girls’ schooling (in time and
space) and the idealization of small-family models appear effective in the long run
(Eager 2017; Hartmann 1987). Sometimes even fundamentally democratic
countries resort to sinister tools: in India, as late as in the mid-1970s, millions
(mainly poor, male “dalits”) were subjected to forced sterilization processes
(Connelly 2006).
Of course, the best-known restrictive demographic policy was put into effect
in China. In the People’s Republic, efforts were made from 1970 to control
population growth, as the badly underdeveloped and extremely authoritarian
economy was incapable of keeping pace with the population explosion in the
production of food and basic necessities (in addition satisfying the characteristically
Communist demand of investing in modernization). Dissatisfaction with the
results achieved until that point called for drastic measures in 1980, urging the
Chinese party apparatus to introduce the single-child policy nationwide (Scharping
2013). The one family — one child rule (which was later slackened with exceptions)
was practically in effect until 2015, while the fertility rate dropped from 2.74 to
1.66, and with 1.28 in 2020, the country was almost at the bottom of the list, so
in 2021 all restrictions were withdrawn.
The evaluation of this program is highly contradictory. It was the largest-scale
intervention in social engineering in recorded history. It brought immense suffering
to the affected generations; the amount of personal tragedies is unfathomable. In
the long term, at least two lasting results can be expected: the sudden application
of the emergency brake caused the Chinese age pyramid to collapse: the “4-2-1”