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because Kierkegaard knows exactly that Hegelian philosophy is
all meaning and no substance, so Hegel cannot include in his
model something that is becoming something else, the Tilblivelse
(becoming) (SKS 4. p.273.), and it is in order to solve this problem
that he cooks up in his “witch’s kitchen” the magical category of the
transitional state. In contrast, Schelling, of course in opposition
to Hegel, puts the emphasis on the existence of reality. In fact,
Hegel writes that
The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and one
might say that the former is refuted by the latter. Likewise, through
the fruit, the blossom itself may be declared to be a false existence of
the plant, since the fruit emerges as the blossom’s truth as it comes
to replace the blossom itself. (PoS.p.4., PdG. p.12.)
It is precisely this that Schelling disputes when he writes regard¬
ing the relationship between the real and the possible that it is like
when we say, “The plant in the seed means the plant potentially,
in pura potentia, while the mature plant is the plant in actu. Here,
potential appears merely as potentia passive, passive possibility,
since the seed does not necessarily have the potential of the plant,
as it also depends on external conditions for this potency to be con¬
verted into actuality - such as soil, rain, sunshine, etc. The mind’s
cognition as potential also appears as potentia passiva (passive
potential), when it is a capability that is able to be developed, and
this depends simultaneously on external influences.” (S.W.I1.3.
p-63.) In simple terms, the Hegelian flower is destroyed if the soil,
sun and rain are only logical constructions. We need to move from
logic to reality, which is evidenced by experience.
And that’s what Narcissus misses. Ovid writes of Echo’s refusal:
“Here, let us meet together”. And, never answering to another sound
more gladly, Echo replies “Together”, and to assist her words comes
out of the woods to put her arms around his neck, in longing. He