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022_000076/0000

On the Concept of Alien

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Author
Zoltán Gyenge
Field of science
Filozófia, filozófiatörténet / Philosophy, history of philosophy (13033)
Type of publication
monográfia
022_000076/0021
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022_000076/0021

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first principle that will create the basis for the creation of cognition is the primary task for humans and for human cognition. But the question is, what is the foundation of this first principle? On first approach, we do not know much about it apart from what is contained in the first law of logic: identification with itself. However, what is certain is that since it is the first principle (Grund-satz), everything else is defined by this, and not the other way around, that is to say, the “other” cannot justify it because it is “the same”, not bounded by the other: unconditional (Unbedingtes). In this sense, the unconditional is that which is self-determined, with nothing else as its “prerequisite.” “The unconditionel is independent of the content of another Grundsatz.” (see Ibid p.12.) It is like the unmoved mover in Aristotle, the originator, which proceeds from itself, not from anything else. This is clearly, under the influence of Fichte, nothing more than the T, or rather the ‘I or intelligence’ (Ich oder Intelligenz). “The I can now only be given through the I, so the basic premise can be this: the Lis the I.” (Ibid). Accordingly, the three first principles according to Schelling are the following: 1) The unconditional (Unbedingtes) is none other than the “I” (das Ich). It is what is called the same. 2.) Everything that can be conditioned is thus “Not-I” (alles Bedingte = Nicht-Ich), that is, what is outside of the “I”. And this is the other. The other is that which stands in opposition to me-as-same, or at least is determined by it — and vice versa. At the same time, it either wants to penetrate into my circles, which I have to guard against, or it determines how far the boundary of the same extends. The separation between the two seems very simple, following the second and third laws of logic: something is either “A” or “not-A”. These cannot both be applied to the same thing at the same time: I cannot say that something is simultaneously a chair and not a chair. The object in question is either a chair or not a chair. If I say “table,” that is also a not-chair. Contradictory opposites exclude each other. There is no third possibility: tertium non datur. Something is either

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