Page 22 [22]
first principle that will create the basis for the creation of cognition
is the primary task for humans and for human cognition. But the
question is, what is the foundation of this first principle? On first
approach, we do not know much about it apart from what is con¬
tained in the first law of logic: identification with itself. However,
what is certain is that since it is the first principle (Grund-satz),
everything else is defined by this, and not the other way around,
that is to say, the “other” cannot justify it because it is “the same”,
not bounded by the other: unconditional (Unbedingtes). In this sense,
the unconditional is that which is self-determined, with nothing
else as its “prerequisite.” “The unconditionel is independent of
the content of another Grundsatz.” (see Ibid p.12.) It is like the
unmoved mover in Aristotle, the originator, which proceeds from
itself, not from anything else. This is clearly, under the influence
of Fichte, nothing more than the T, or rather the ‘I or intelligence’
(Ich oder Intelligenz). “The I can now only be given through the I,
so the basic premise can be this: the Lis the I.” (Ibid). Accordingly,
the three first principles according to Schelling are the following:
1) The unconditional (Unbedingtes) is none other than the “I” (das
Ich). It is what is called the same.
2.) Everything that can be conditioned is thus “Not-I” (alles Bedingte
= Nicht-Ich), that is, what is outside of the “I”. And this is the other.
The other is that which stands in opposition to me-as-same, or at
least is determined by it — and vice versa. At the same time, it either
wants to penetrate into my circles, which I have to guard against,
or it determines how far the boundary of the same extends. The
separation between the two seems very simple, following the second
and third laws of logic: something is either “A” or “not-A”. These
cannot both be applied to the same thing at the same time: I cannot
say that something is simultaneously a chair and not a chair. The
object in question is either a chair or not a chair. If I say “table,”
that is also a not-chair. Contradictory opposites exclude each other.
There is no third possibility: tertium non datur. Something is either