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MARTIN MOORS the attribute of justice (God as just judge). For Kant, there is nothing mysterious regarding the “cognition of the highest good,” nor can it be considered to be mysterious that God will judge “the fitness of the will for the highest good”” according to principles of justice. Considered in their practical signification, both these attributes—lawgiver and judge—and their moral qualifications— holiness and justice—are “perfectly cognized” as they are thoroughly revealed by objective principles of reason. Kant states: “With respect to that which is universal human duty to have cognition of (namely anything moral) there can be no mystery.”* In the religious domain, mysteries can only reside with respect to what God alone can do: first, in accordance with the holiness of his moral lawgiving; second, in accordance with the benevolence of his moral guardianship; third, in accordance with the justice of his moral judging. Differing from our thorough cognizance with respect to what God as Legislator and Obligator has commanded us as moral duties, it completely exceeds our human capacities to know anything about three things: first, how in his holiness God will cooperate with human moral beings to attain the final end of moral freedom; second, how in his benevolence God will rule and love [amor benevolentiae]* the world; third, how in his justice God will judge the fitness of the disposition for the highest good. In his Religion book, Kant states: “with respect to that which God alone can do, for which to do anything ourselves would exceed our capacity and also our duty, there we can have a genuine, i.e., a holy, mystery of religion (mysterium).”* In order for humans to attain the final grounds of moral freedom as conditioned by his legislation, i.e., happiness, under the conditioning rule of justice assessing the human being worthy to this happiness, “an omnipotent moral being must be assumed as ruler of the world, under whose care this would come about.” For Kant, mysteries are thus located in “that which God alone can do”** in his threefold capacity of legislator, ruler of the world, and judge in order for finite moral human beings to make attainable what is purposively set out to be realized as the final moral end. In this respect, Kant states: “Since by himself the human being cannot realize the idea of the supreme good inseparably bound up with the pure moral disposition [...], he finds himself driven to believe in the cooperation /Mitwirkung] or the management /Veranstaltung] of a moral ruler of the world, through which alone this end is possible. And here opens 79 Ibid. 80 Religion, Ak 6, 138n. 8! For more on this issue of love, see my chapter “Kant on ‘Love God above all, and your neighbour as yourself," in The Concept of Love in 17th and 18th Century Philosophy, edited by Gábor Boros, Herman De Dijn, Martin Moors, Leuven, Leuven University Press, and Budapest, Eötvös Loránd University Press, 2007, 245—269. # Religion, Ak 6, 139n. 53 Religion, Ak 6, 8n. # Religion, Ak 6, 139n. + 236 ¢ Daréczi-Sepsi-Vassänyi_Initiation_155x240.indb 236 6 2020.06.15. 11:04:22
