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GERD VAN RIEL
As, therefore, monad and limit and father and subsistence and aether, if you like,
are all different from each other among the determinate realities in this world be¬
low, just as their names in fact indicate, yet in the higher realm they are all illustra¬
tions or symbols that belong to a unique nature, so too is the One [such a symbol],
even if it is different from each of these [symbols], and yet there, the One is also
a manifestation of this same nature. (tr. Rappe)’””
The terminology does not seem to matter; what matters is that we must
inquire, because our Aöyog needs to understand things:
This is the origin of its also being called the One-many, because it contains in
its own many the complete cause of the things that proceed from it by means
of every division. And thus the Chaldaeans call it the “Source of Sources”, and
Orpheus calls it “Metis, pregnant with the seed of the gods”, and the Phoenicians
call it the “Cosmic Aion”, since it has gathered all things into itself. But we are
accustomed to attributing these names to the lower limit of the intelligibles,
whereas the intelligible is One and being together, yet this is One-many but not
One-Being. Plato showed that the One-Being is the indefinite dyad, but not the One
absolutum. Yet our reason seeks further the nature of this so-called absolute One¬
many, which is not the One-Being.”
as we are attempting, quite literally? And why not, someone might aver. For what ought to
have proceeded after the One, if not the two, and after the monad, the dyad, and in this way
for the remaining number to proceed? This, at least, is [what Orpheus] has in mind when
he brings in aether and chaos after Chronos. The gods [that is, the Chaldaean Oracles]
reveal the father and the power as the sole dyad after the one god, and almost all traditional
theologies agree in doing the same. But apart from [the weight of tradition], the argument
itself demands [this view], since Being is from the limit and the unlimited, as Plato says in
the Philebus and Philolaus says in his On Nature, and in general, since the concepts of “one”
and “being” are different, Being should not be the same thing as the One. And yet Being
participates in the One; therefore it possesses what is not one, as well.”
Damascius, DP II 10, 3-12: ‘(Q¢ obv povag kai népac kal natip Kal Örrapkıs Kal aldnp, ei Bovkeı,
ÉV TOÚTOLG EV TOIg Ötwpronevorg AAXo Kal AAXo Kadarep Kal Ta Hvonata Eyei, EKei ÖE HLGG
pÜoews Navta Eoti napadeiynata fi odußoAa, oütw Kai TO &v, ei Kai GANO Tap’ ExaoTOV TOVTWV,
GAN éxei THs avdtijs Evderypa Kai TOÜTO Pboewc. See also DP III 109, 4-14.
Damascius, DP II 210, 6-17: 68ev kai Ev MoAAG AEyeTal, Wo OvVELANPOS KATA TA EAVTOD TOAAA
TÍJV Tauopov aitiav tav an’ abtod mpoidvtwv Kad’ dmotovodv pEptopov- S0Eev my Hév
THY@v abtd Xaddaiwv naidec dvevenpodtorv, Opgedcs dé Mijtiv onepya PEpovta Vewv, Doivikes
5é ai@va KOOLIKOYV, Ws TavTa év EaAVT@ ovvjpyKota. AAAA TAÜTA TO TÉPATL TOV VONTÓV ÉTTÁYY ELV
eiwdanev. TO 5é vontov, Ev Kal Ov TO OVvaupöTEpoV, TOUTO dé Ev TOAAG Kai Ody Ev dv. ‘O SE
IIAatwv 16 Ev Öv édeikvy TAfjBoG űreipov, AAN odxi uövov TO Ev. Enulntei 5é Swe 6 Aöyog Kal
toto TO Ev MOAAA AMA AeyopEvov, GAN odyi Ev dv. See also DP II 174, 1-11: “After these
[investigations into procession], we must inquire about the intelligible and that which is
called the completely unified, and ask if it contains a differentiation in itself and an order
that [consists in] a first, middle and final pleroma, or whether as the philosophers say it
consists of Being and life and intellect, or whether [its composition is] as the theologians say,
who in various ways fill out the intelligible principles, or as the Chaldaeans say, who speak
reverently of the paternal triad. If we intend to pursue this discussion skillfully, we must take
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