MYSTICISM AND RATIONALITY.
A NEOPLATONIC PERSPECTIVE
It is often argued that later Neoplatonists, and especially Proclus and
Damascius, were mystics rather than philosophers, meaning that, despite
their rational philosophical endeavours, they ultimately engaged in an
irrational encounter with the divine. This claim is easily made on the basis
of the emphasis these authors put on theurgy, on worshipping the gods as
instances of the One ineffable principle, etc.
This contribution aims to challenge overly facile views of Damascius’
mysticism. Starting from explicit references to the need to find the right
balance between theurgy and philosophy (in Damascius’ Vita Isidori and in his
Phaedo commentary) and studying Damascius’ account of the ascent towards
the highest principle, I argue that mysticism in this case is the outcome of
a thoroughly rational project, which explores the limits of rational discourse
and which, in its mystical experience, never fails to account for the mystical
experience in a rational way.
When Europe was trembling—as it always seems to be doing—at the beginning
of the 20" century, various attempts were made to uncover ideology, unmask
nonsensical but genuinely dangerous language, and allow scientific rationality
to prevail as a safe haven in which the distinction between true propositions
and nonsense could be made. Today, I have to add, a similar nonsensical
discourse seems to have taken the lead in Europe, driven not so much by
ideology but by populistic tenets, and the outcome seems to be the same all
over again: the detriment of the most vulnerable people—will we ever learn?
In any event, in this early 20'*-century endeavour to unmask nonsensical
language, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus played a major role. He provided
philosophers and scientists with a helpful tool to demarcate the boundaries
Daréczi-Sepsi-Vassänyi_Initiation_155x240.indb 171 6 2020.06.15. 11:04:19