Oldal 275 [275]
OCR
A KANTIAN ‘FOUNDATION’ OF HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH THE IMPOSSIBILITY... forms of collectivism meant to redefine what individuals really ‘are’; they have become new addressees of human rights, intended to replace ‘Western-style’ individuality. Chapter II of this paper deals with two of such collectivisms. Transformed into official documents in the 1990ies, they still play, in updated versions, a prominent role in the global discourse on human rights. Reciprocally, it has been claimed that ‘Western-style’ human rights are likewise expressions of ideological biases favoring one’s own domestic product. But is it so? For many of its defenders it was Immanuel Kant who has provided a viable ethical-philosophical foundation? of those claims more than two centuries ago. Chapter III is about those claims. But I think there could be other sources for the defense of modern human rights, yet not by arguing in favor of certain moral assumptions, but rather negatively, namely by demonstrating an impossibility in principle of unambiguously defining humanity (Chapter I). Some of Kant’s theoretical (‘transcendental’) doctrines are helpful in this aspect (Chapter IV). This would have, in turn, consequences for the political status of human rights (Conclusion). But prior to it I briefly consider what I mean under foundation. I. SOME THOUGHTS ON ‘FOUNDATION’ Human rights concepts hold — implicitly or explicitly — that there is something like a nature in human beings which deserves special attention and protection, which, in turn, requires special legitimation. Unsurprisingly, the nature of this ‘nature’ differs depending on the various cultures and political circumstances in which drafters of human rights texts are situated. Those contexts are contingent; they are the sources of values from where proofs ‘prove’ this — and not that - version of human rights. Theoretically, they are all equivalent for they all lack (by nature, one is tempted to say) gapless and rigid intellectual immunity vis-a-vis criticisms from other competitors. It seems that the foundation business within a multi-cultural context runs dry. Is there a way out? I think there is. I believe that a position which refers to human dignity as its core humanum — just as Article 1 of the UDHR does — makes a point in this direction. It differs from alternative models in an important way. Its assumption namely abstains from a precise and substantial qualification, rendering its accurate definition an 2 This enterprise seems to be futile when recalling what an author of the first draft of the UDHR, asked about the principles of that emerging Declaration, replied: ‘No philosophy whatsoever.’ (Steven Pinker, Enlightenment Now, New York, NY, Viking, 2018, 419) + 273 +
