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A KANTIAN ‘FOUNDATION’ OF HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH THE IMPOSSIBILITY...
forms of collectivism meant to redefine what individuals really ‘are’; they have
become new addressees of human rights, intended to replace ‘Western-style’
individuality.
Chapter II of this paper deals with two of such collectivisms. Transformed into
official documents in the 1990ies, they still play, in updated versions, a prominent
role in the global discourse on human rights.
Reciprocally, it has been claimed that ‘Western-style’ human rights are likewise
expressions of ideological biases favoring one’s own domestic product. But is it so?
For many of its defenders it was Immanuel Kant who has provided a viable
ethical-philosophical foundation? of those claims more than two centuries ago.
Chapter III is about those claims.
But I think there could be other sources for the defense of modern human rights,
yet not by arguing in favor of certain moral assumptions, but rather negatively,
namely by demonstrating an impossibility in principle of unambiguously defining
humanity (Chapter I). Some of Kant’s theoretical (‘transcendental’) doctrines are
helpful in this aspect (Chapter IV). This would have, in turn, consequences for
the political status of human rights (Conclusion). But prior to it I briefly consider
what I mean under foundation.
I. SOME THOUGHTS ON ‘FOUNDATION’
Human rights concepts hold — implicitly or explicitly — that there is something like
a nature in human beings which deserves special attention and protection, which,
in turn, requires special legitimation. Unsurprisingly, the nature of this ‘nature’
differs depending on the various cultures and political circumstances in which
drafters of human rights texts are situated. Those contexts are contingent; they
are the sources of values from where proofs ‘prove’ this — and not that - version of
human rights. Theoretically, they are all equivalent for they all lack (by nature, one
is tempted to say) gapless and rigid intellectual immunity vis-a-vis criticisms from
other competitors. It seems that the foundation business within a multi-cultural
context runs dry. Is there a way out? I think there is.
I believe that a position which refers to human dignity as its core humanum
— just as Article 1 of the UDHR does — makes a point in this direction. It differs
from alternative models in an important way. Its assumption namely abstains
from a precise and substantial qualification, rendering its accurate definition an
2 This enterprise seems to be futile when recalling what an author of the first draft of the
UDHR, asked about the principles of that emerging Declaration, replied: ‘No philosophy
whatsoever.’ (Steven Pinker, Enlightenment Now, New York, NY, Viking, 2018, 419)
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