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70 I THE Puttosopny or Eco-Pouirics
and pain. For the guestion is not whether they can speak but whether
they can suffer, as Peter Singer argues with reference to the position of
the Enlightenment-era moral philosopher and advocate of animal rights,
Jeremy Bentham." The pathocentrists, such as Richard Ryder, naturally
condemn the experiments conducted on live animals for the purpose of
scientific research or finding a cure.» They drew attention to the terrible
fate of the livestock languishing in the hell of industrial biomass¬
production. In their opinion, the wellbeing or health of man cannot
justify the suffering inflicted upon other beings. To the common
objection that suffering belongs to the order of nature and is therefore
unavoidable, the thinkers defending animal wellbeing had an easy
answer: it is not for us to interfere in the order of nature, but merely to
at least not cause suffering to other beings intentionally in the service
of our own human interests. We should at any rate to attempt to
minimise the suffering caused to them.
Serious counter-arguments have also been raised by other
extensionists against the argument from suffering, however. The bio¬
egalitarians, such as Kenneth Goodpaster, find the newly demarcated
borders of the ethical universe just as arbitrary as the old ones, claiming
that suffering is not necessarily bad and pleasure is not necessarily good
and that what is good or bad in a given case depends on whether it serves
the maintenance of life.*’ What is unequivocally good for living beings
- regardless of whether they can experience joy or suffering — is life itself,
in the interest of the maintenance and renewal of which they are capable
of astonishing and inventive efforts. Their behaviour proves that what
happens to them matters to them: things can have a good or bad
outcome for them. Insofar as the chief characteristic of living systems
is distinguishing between good and bad, then (according to the
bioegalitarian point of view), the ethical law can be none other than
respect of life. We, who are capable of recognising the will to life working
in every living thing, should see it as our duty to act with this in mind.
Such is one of Paul Taylor’s final conclusions.** Taylor effectively
proceeds according to the spirit of the Kantian ethics of duty, with the
not inconsiderable difference that while Kant reserved the ability for
autonomous action and the corresponding respect solely for beings
1° Peter Singer: 4 Animals Are Equal! Philosophical Exchange 1.5., 1974.
32 Richard Ryder: Victims of Science: The Use of Animals in Research. Davis-Poynter Ltd.
1975.
33 Kenneth Goodpaster: On Being Morally Considerable. Journal of Philosophy 75,1978.
34 Paul Taylor: The ethics of respect for nature. Environmental Ethics 3(3), 1981.