communication which can no longer be tied to a place: these simply take
no notice of the existence of nations. How dare a political community
living within borders of one kind or another limit the right of a
(corporate) empire or an (informational) camarilla to dispose as it sees
fit of the land of others, the treasures of the soil and people’s desires,
convictions and labour? In the eyes of the technocrats and cosmopolitans
of our age, this idea seems just as absurd as it once did to the jurists of
absolute monarchy. The great invention of enlightened modernity, the
nation, no longer unites the heirs of the common historical fate: the
supporters of free trade and the prophets of world revolution would both
gladly throw it as outdated tripe on the rubbish heap of history. National
belonging no longer provides the frame of reference for self¬
identification. It does not help bridge the gap between people who live
together but speak many languages, belong to various ethnicities and
live in different social situations. This revives the importance of such
premodern markers of identity as skin colour, origin and religion, while
livelihood and asserting oneself in society often depend more on success
in transnational networks. Citizenship, place of residence and work and
nationality diverge for an increasing number of people: they live in
communities divided along multiple lines, with multiple identities. The
local knowledge which hitherto united cultural communities has become
folklore: possibly worthy of respect but a useless antique nonetheless, in
contrast with the knowledge of the educated, which is effectively the
same at any point of the world (as was once the knowledge of
Christianity and the Early Modern humanists) and can be shared with
anyone who speaks the Latin of our age, English.
‘The world works according to predictable laws. Whoever makes his
calculations correctly, has power over things. This is the great recognition
of the age of Descartes, Bacon, Kepler and Spinoza, that knowledge is
power. The relation of knowledge and power is today seen in a new (but
nonetheless suspiciously familiar) light, thanks to postmodern
philosophy, which emphasises the impossibility of giving scientific
statements an ultimate foundation. In the opinion of Jean-Francois
Lyotard, the mutually incomparable language games (previously:
"truths") will be judged by their own performance." This is a valid truth,
which increases the performance of the given system (theory, economic
system, government). Ihe program of the Enlightenment, that truth