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OCR
160 | Zsolt Nagy, Zoltán Simon, Viktor Szép, and Tamás Dezső Ziegler protectionist measures discriminating against the US defence industry and diverting resources from NATO. Ironically, the opposite effect was also true: the Trump administrations wavering commitment to the Atlantic alliance gave renewed impetus to the quest for European strategic autonomy, and generated broader support for it among EU Member States than ever before. Over time, a more constructive attitude has also emerged in Washington, not least with the incoming Bidenadministration, suggesting that the US should rather support, instead of criticising, EU defence initiatives as long as they strengthen the transatlantic bond and the European pillar of the alliance in the spirit of more burdensharing. It should not be forgotten either that the EU’s renewed effort to enhance its security and defence cooperation is taking place in the context of Brexit. The UK, one of the largest and most potent European military forces, has left the Union, which undoubtedly has an impact on European aspirations for strategic autonomy, and for the time being it is an open question as to how future defence cooperation between the EU and the UK will evolve. Three aspects of strategic autonomy are usually considered as the most relevant for a more European approach to defence: notably the political, operational, and industrial dimensions. Regarding the political aspect, EU institutions and procedures needed for acting autonomously if and when necessary do exist. Often asked questions concern more the political will for using these instruments in practice. It might also be worth recalling that the Lisbon Treaty’s full potential, which allows for constructive abstention in decision-making or the possibility to act in smaller groups of willing Member States, remains to be explored. Another - somewhat underestimated — aspect of political autonomy and the underlying need for greater impact is the issue of leadership. It is a widely shared view that the Franco-German relationship is crucial with regard to European security and defence cooperation, and consequently strategic autonomy. We have seen, however, that despite declarations and some renewed efforts, this convergence between Berlin and Paris is not a given at all. In the operational dimension, the objective is to underpin political ambitions with adequate military capabilities. The EUGS refers to the need for developing high-end capabilities, or hard power in other words. The aspiration of President von der Leyen and other EU leaders to make the Union a geopolitical actor mirrors the objective of going beyond the Union's traditional soft power profile. Recent defence initiatives, such as PESCO, or the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, have been important steps in this direction, as they aim to further deepen cooperation among Member States and render the European capability landscape more consistent. Another pertinent question is how the EU shall translate the Lisbon Treaty’s mutual assistance clause into military capabilities, and what role the Union should play in its territorial defence in the light of its overlapping membership
