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than the Union’s strategic autonomy, while lacking the institutional aspect
of the term. For some, the “EU option is the most logical’, as the Union
provides the best institutional framework for pursuing European strategic
autonomy (Biscop 2019, 124). Others, however, do not see a reason for
linking this objective to any specific institutional setting (e.g. Jarvenpaa
et al. 2019).
The challenges and pitfalls of strategic autonomy are also highlighted in the
academic discourse. One of the standard counterarguments is that European
strategic autonomy would weaken, or even undermine, the transatlantic
alliance. In Tocci’s view, a more pertinent problem is that Europeans’ quest
for autonomy will lead to power concentration and protectionism within the
Union, going against the very core values of the integration project (Tocci 2021).
Others criticise the lack of clarity of the term; or argue that it has a French
flavour, which raises suspicions in some EU countries. Dismissive opinions
also point to various in-built contradictions in the idea, or even call it a “toxic
debate” that lacks any concrete political programme (Major and Mölling 2020).
Beyond the academic polemics, EU Member States also maintain diverging
approaches towards strategic autonomy in security and defence - even if
cleavages have somewhat diminished recently due to a growing number of
voices supporting the orientation towards more autonomous actions. Several
studies have been devoted to analysing Member States’ attitudes in this regard,
showing that conflicting national positions are mainly driven by a diversity
of strategic cultures and threat perceptions.
Not surprisingly, the idea of strategic autonomy is the most elaborated in
the Union’s sole nuclear power, France, as the sense of autonomy is deeply
rooted in the country’s strategic thinking. While there is an ever-present
suspicion towards the French position, Paris has regularly underlined that
she was bound to her commitments in NATO, whose alliance shall remain
responsible for European territorial defence.
In the case of Germany, the notion of strategic autonomy cannot be detected
in official documents. Nevertheless, a paradigm shift can be noticed in Berlin’s
approach towards European security and defence cooperation through
taking more responsibility, including in the EU framework. However, the rift
between the German and French views persists, as also mirrored explicitly
in the former German Minister of Defence Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer’s
call for an “end to illusions of European strategic autonomy?
Intra-EU divergences about the need for strategic autonomy are linked
in many ways to the relations with the United States and with NATO.
The doubters - most prominently the Baltic States and Poland - fear that
more European autonomy will lead to less American involvement in, and
commitment to, Europe’ security. This sentiment has also been reinforced
by American concerns about recent EU defence initiatives - notably the
launch of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European
Defence Fund (EDF) - which were considered by many in Washington as