References to the need for a strengthening of the EU’s strategic autonomy
have become recurring elements of practically all documents adopted by
either the European Council, the Council, or the European Commission on
security and defence matters today. Although the exact meaning of the concept
remains largely undefined, and therefore controversial, these two words
have mobilised a great deal of intellectual reflection and, more importantly,
point to the heart of the question of what role Europe should play in its own
security and defence.
The security environment of Europe is becoming increasingly complex
with unresolved and long-standing risks, as well as emerging new challenges,
and even threats in both the eastern and southern flanks of the continent. At
the same time, major geopolitical shifts can be witnessed in our post-Cold
War world, with a weakening rules-based international order, the relative
decline of the US, a rising and more assertive China, and an increasingly
aggressive and unpredictable Russia. Europe cannot ignore these dynamics:
it needs to redefine its place and role in this unfolding new world. The debate
about European strategic autonomy has emerged in this context; while the
COVID-19 pandemic has only reinforced it.
The notion of strategic autonomy is rooted in French strategic thinking. The
first appearance of the concept dates back to 1994, when France's White Paper
on Defence referred to strategic autonomy as an objective to be guaranteed by
the defence forces. This nationally oriented approach was gradually elevated
to the European level, first in 1998, when France and the United Kingdom
agreed upon deepening European-level defence cooperation.
Through a carefully balanced compromise, the Franco-British Joint
Declaration signed in Saint-Malo embraced the aspect of autonomy, without
qualifying it as strategic, although: “the Union must have the capacity for
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide
to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international
crises”. It was in this spirit that the UK agreed to develop autonomous
European capacities to execute crisis management operations, while France
accepted that this should remain compatible with NATO policies.
More than a decade later, in 2013, the European Commission’s
communication on defence industry brought the concept back into the
limelight by claiming that