conseguences do not depend on normative aspects (Strömbáck and Esser
2014, 251-252). In other words, mediatisation does not have a starting or
end point, but is influenced by the events to which politicians adapt for the
sake of their success. Politicians use this compelling force, which eventually
ends in self-representation, as "self-initiated stage management and media
friendly packaging” (Esser 2013, 162). Self-mediatisation is one of the main
features in populist politicians’ communication throughout Europe today.
Notwithstanding country differences, European democracies seem to be
generally affected by political populism (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008).
Two approaches towards populism can be distinguished here. The first one
defines the identity of populist political actors and identifies elements that
may explain their existence and influence through the way they communicate.
The other explores populist political communication’s core features and
how political actors utilise populist political communication. The first
perspective focuses on populist political actors, while the second on populist
communication techniques, tactics, styles, and rhetoric. The extent to which
specific political players participate in populist communication makes
inferences regarding the prevalence and pervasiveness of populist political
communication, and with regard to which political actors are considered to
be populist (Stanyer et al. 2017).
Populist political actors in Europe are often equated with far-right, anti¬
immigration behaviours and nationalism. Examples include the Austrian
Freedom Party, Vlaams Belang (Belgium), the National Rally (France),
Golden Dawn (Greece), Fidesz- Hungarian Civic Alliance (Hungary), the
Party for Freedom (the Netherlands), the Progress Party (Norway), Law and
Justice (Poland), the Democratic Renewal Party (Portugal), or the Swedish
Democrats. Some of them are regionalists, too, such as Lega Nord (Italy) or
the Platform for Catalonia (Spain, dissolved in 2019).
Although these parties are easily identified as populists in Europe, they
are not the only political actors characterised as such. Several parties and
movements, including ANO (previously Action of Dissatisfied Citizens)
in the Czech Republic, the Five Star Movement in Italy, the 12" of March
Movement in Portugal, or Podemos in Spain, have capitalised in similar
ways on widespread discontent generated by corruption scandals and
the implementation of unpopular policies. These parties and movements
frequently promise the revitalisation of political processes and more direct
forms of democracy (Stanyer et al. 2017, 356). Asa result, consistent ideology
is not a distinguishing trait of populist political actors in Europe. Some are
extreme right, others are far left, and some are in the middle of the political
spectrum. Several populist actors combine right-wing and populist elements