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Fear and securitisation | 127 multiculturalism, and interpreted the crisis as the humiliation of the nation. In contrast, the local indignation movement and the radical left Syriza party saw the crisis as a structural malfunction of capitalism, and considered austerity policies as morally outrageous, hence many Greeks were pushed into poverty and hopeless situations by them (Davou and Demertzis 2013; Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos 2013). Left-wing populist movements and parties have been more successful in those countries that were more deeply affected by the economic crisis. Because many in society have experienced the hardships of austerity politics, this common experience liberated them from blaming themselves for losing their jobs or for their difficult (economic) situation, so they mostly felt that they were humiliated and destroyed by politics (Simiti 2016). In contrast, in those countries that were less affected by the economic crisis, people faced its effects on the individual level, so they accepted more the possibility that they might have been responsible for their bad situation. The populist parties on the right transform this kind of shame into anger, resentment, and general hatred towards the ‘Other’. On the other hand, leftists interpret these negative feelings and shame as a shared burden, which similarly can be transformed into anger and resentment towards the Other. However, they can be converted into positive emotions, too, such as pride, joy, or hope, which later can become the basis for civil rights and identity politics movements (Salmela and Von Scheve 2017). DISCOURSE OF FEAR The connection between populism and fear is clearly shown in the literature. The ideology of populism finds fertile breeding ground in the uncertainty of postmodernism. Most populists’ emotional repertoire is fundamentally based on who poses a threat to voters, who is in danger, and whom we should blame for all this (Bericat 2016, 99). The gaining ground of right-wing populist parties can be explained by the successful construction and maintenance of the discourse of fear. The most important tool in this is the phenomenon of othering (Wodak 2015). Othering is a broadly inclusive conceptual framework in which individuals or groups are defined and labelled different from the in-group (Riggins 1997, 3). The dominant group has the opportunity to identify those traits, practices, and patterns that are supposed to be followed in society. At the same time, we do not only speak about a demarcation line between “We and “Them; but about a value judgement formed over the habits and the lifestyle of the Other (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1972). The out-group is often associated with negative qualities, which make it suitable to appear in the role of the enemy. These negative characteristics tend to become stereotypes and
