In his book Creating Fear, David Altheide (2002) argues that fear has played
a prominent role in shaping public opinion lately. He does not primarily
write about criminal threats when he claims that the discourse of fear has
become prevalent. Fear is an omnipotent element of shaping identities and
participating in social life nowadays. The media offers millions of stories that
we can identify with, and the common component of these stories is often the
sense of fear. Fear provides an explanation and solution, it is an important
part of social control, and we can become part of the community by being
afraid of what others are.
The role of fear in identity formation can be better understood through
the phenomenon of populism. In their article, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa
Norris examined the popularity of right-wing populist parties. The authors
see the success of these parties in the economic and cultural uncertainties.
According to them, material risks have come to the fore again, making
individuals feel vulnerable due to the precarious labour market situation and
growing social inequalities. Class-based politics has disappeared and instead
of problematising economic issues, the focus has been on identity politics.
Economic uncertainties combined with the erosion of perceived traditional
values provide fertile ground for the advancement of right-wing populist
parties (Inglehart and Norris 2016).
A very similar argumentation can be found in Edgar Grande’s and Hanspeter
Kriesi’s thesis of losers of globalisation (2012). According to this theory, the
increased economic competition, cultural diversity, political integration,
and the process of globalisation have created their winners and losers. It is
important how globalisation has affected the sense of danger and the subjective
experience of different types of grievances. The losers are simultaneously
feeling economic insecurity, a threat from groups with different cultural
backgrounds, and the loss of national autonomy. The support for populist
parties is high, especially among those who have been left behind: those who
are insecure about their identities, and often about their entire lives; who
experience alienation and disintegration in their social relations; and those
who feel frustrated and distrustful about politics and democracy.
Left-wing populist parties usually blame neoliberal ideologies and various
supranational institutions (International Monetary Fund, European Union)
that they support policies which increase injustice, inequality, and insecurity.
This process evokes the sense of anger and outrage in individuals, which rest
primarily on moral ground. In contrast, the right mostly blames refugees,
immigrants, the unemployed, and ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities.
They also bring to the surface emotions that are based on the rejection of
immoral and inappropriate behaviour, but these emotions are fuelled by
repressed shame, as the targets in this case are the ‘uncertain self the enemies
of the questioned identity (Salmela and Von Scheve 2017; 2018).
For example, during the economic crisis, the Greek Golden Dawn
blamed the corrupt political elite, immigrants, and the phenomenon of