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Democracy and distrust | 115 In his argument, as cited above, the evolution is clear and obvious: the consolidation of constitutional liberalism, namely the guaranteeing of basic rights and liberties, the rule of law, and the division of power, slowly but surely led to equality, and to universal suffrage. Therefore, after two centuries, democracy was finally established. The lesson is clear, newly democratised countries simply have to follow the same path without deviation. His famous quote that “if a democracy does not preserve liberty and law, that it is a democracy is a small consolation” (Zakaria 1997, 40) suggests that from these two elements, it is constitutional liberalism that matters the most, not democracy.* Berman, however, corrects Zakaria's story about the evolution of democracy. In her article, which was published twenty years after Zakaria’s, she claimed that the history of liberal democracy had happened otherwise. According to her, unlike Zakaria suggested, liberalism (and constitutional liberalism) developed together with democracy, not before it, and “rather than being the norm, liberal democracy has been the exception, even in the West” (Berman 2017, 30). Revising ups and downs in the history of democracy in Germany, France, the UK, and Italy, she concludes that “in most European countries, illiberal and failed democratic experiments turned out to be part of the long-term struggle to build liberal democracy” (Berman 2017, 34). Thus, her message is that current illiberal and populist tendencies in Europe and elsewhere, though they are very worrying, cannot be seen as arguments against democracy in favour of liberal constitutionalism. On this basis, liberalism without democracy, the pipe dream of undemocratic liberalism, is no less dangerous than vice versa, as Zakaria stated. As Berman writes, [iln the past, liberalism without democracy often led to an oligarchic system dominated by a wealthy elite (such as Britain’s landowning gentry) or a dominant ethnic or religious group (such as white Protestants in the United States). Elites are no less moved by passion and self-interest than anyone else. If allowed to dominate politics to the exclusion of other citizens, they are likely to restrict to themselves the enjoyment of liberal rights, as well as access to economic resources and social status. (Berman 2017, 37) In another work of hers, Berman offers a different evolution of the story of democracy. According to this, what we call today liberal democracy was established after the Second World War as a system called social democracy. In the many political changes that occurred after 1945, the most important 4 Cas Mudde comes to the same conclusion, stating that current illiberal-populist trends “can only be overcome by more rather than less liberal democracy” (Mudde 2021, 578).
