Oldal 117 [117]
Democracy and distrust | 115
In his argument, as cited above, the evolution is clear and obvious: the
consolidation of constitutional liberalism, namely the guaranteeing of basic
rights and liberties, the rule of law, and the division of power, slowly but
surely led to equality, and to universal suffrage. Therefore, after two centuries,
democracy was finally established. The lesson is clear, newly democratised
countries simply have to follow the same path without deviation. His famous
quote that “if a democracy does not preserve liberty and law, that it is a
democracy is a small consolation” (Zakaria 1997, 40) suggests that from
these two elements, it is constitutional liberalism that matters the most, not
democracy.*
Berman, however, corrects Zakaria's story about the evolution of democracy.
In her article, which was published twenty years after Zakaria’s, she claimed
that the history of liberal democracy had happened otherwise. According
to her, unlike Zakaria suggested, liberalism (and constitutional liberalism)
developed together with democracy, not before it, and “rather than being
the norm, liberal democracy has been the exception, even in the West”
(Berman 2017, 30). Revising ups and downs in the history of democracy in
Germany, France, the UK, and Italy, she concludes that “in most European
countries, illiberal and failed democratic experiments turned out to be part
of the long-term struggle to build liberal democracy” (Berman 2017, 34).
Thus, her message is that current illiberal and populist tendencies in Europe
and elsewhere, though they are very worrying, cannot be seen as arguments
against democracy in favour of liberal constitutionalism.
On this basis, liberalism without democracy, the pipe dream of undemocratic
liberalism, is no less dangerous than vice versa, as Zakaria stated. As Berman
writes,
[iln the past, liberalism without democracy often led to an oligarchic system
dominated by a wealthy elite (such as Britain’s landowning gentry) or a dominant
ethnic or religious group (such as white Protestants in the United States). Elites are
no less moved by passion and self-interest than anyone else. If allowed to dominate
politics to the exclusion of other citizens, they are likely to restrict to themselves the
enjoyment of liberal rights, as well as access to economic resources and social status.
(Berman 2017, 37)
In another work of hers, Berman offers a different evolution of the story of
democracy. According to this, what we call today liberal democracy was
established after the Second World War as a system called social democracy.
In the many political changes that occurred after 1945, the most important
4 Cas Mudde comes to the same conclusion, stating that current illiberal-populist trends
“can only be overcome by more rather than less liberal democracy” (Mudde 2021, 578).