Oldal 159 [159]
OCR
THE TRAGEDY AND COMEDY OF THE COMMONS 157 enough. They must be enforced, which often comes up against obstacles. It can be a problem that governments would have to set up and run too many control organizations to achieve complete obedience to the laws. In addition, powerful lobbies are able to corrupt the guardians of law enforcement. Thirdly, the governments — particularly those in charge of large geographic areas — are often insufficiently informed to be able to enact the adeguate laws, regulations and incentives. For lack of information, a well-meaning governmental decision may also lead the processes onto the wrong track. (Small)community, non-governmental social processes Noticing the deterioration of the quality of the pasture, some leading cow owners called a meeting that was attended by all the cattle farmers. They all agreed upon the maximum number of cows: they agreed by consensus that each could drive a maximum of two cows to grass. The decision was rejected solely by the “outsider” farmer who was the first to buy a second cow, but he soon became so disliked in the village that he felt compelled to move out. Though the farmers spent much time and energy on defining, enforcing and constantly improving the rules of pasture use, and they were not always perfectly successful, the measure proved on the whole and in the long run successful. It is true that the living standards of nearly all of them deteriorated considerably, but the farmers and their families lived happily ever after for generations. In this case, the group of people (maybe organizations) organize themselves “from the grassroots” into a community, creating (typically unwritten) rules (norms) and having them mutually observed. They also effect changes on the rules collectively, without any governmental actor taking part in the process. The community members are inclined to abide by the norms for various reasons. First, because they keep an eye on one other. This exerts collective pressure on each member to observe the rules, and also, they are afraid of the punishment for breaching the rules. Secondly, it is in their interest to have a good reputation because in case of difficulties they can receive help from other community members more easily (Milinski et al. 2002; Rockenbach — Milinski 2006; Wedekind — Milinski 2000). Thirdly, the members of the community mutually respect and bear responsibility for one another and for the community — that is, where there is a community, the mutual moral commitment to one another is more likely to appear (McCay — Jentoft 2010). Fourthly, people more commonly and gladly conform to (partly) self-made rules than those imposed upon them from above. Such community members tend to choose collaboration instead of rivalry. Though they do not necessarily go beyond their narrowly conceived, short-term self-interests, they often do. A prerequisite for this is that the group members should know each other well and that their collective will be coherent. In the past, tragedy was often avoided in cases of actual pastures and other natural resources (e.g., forests, shoreline fishing areas, etc.) by creating source management systems that were sustained for a long time, in some cases to this very day." 13 Several examples are discussed e.g. by Feeny et al (1990) and Ostrom et al. (2002). Other examples can be drawn from the Carpathian Basin. In the early modern age, village communities in the
