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102 ATTILA PANOVICS
The rule of law requires that legal norms prevail in regulated legal relations, that
is, that the recipients of legal norms comply with the legal rules that apply to them.
Hungary’s constitution (Fundamental Law of Hungary) also considers the rule of
law to be a fundamental value,' the most essential conceptual element of which
is the principle of legal certainty (Sélyom 2001: 92). As the Hungarian Constitutional
Court formulated at the very beginning of its operation: “One of the fundamental
requirements of the rule of law is that bodies with public power carry out their activities
within the organizational framework established by law, within the operational
framework established by law, within the limits of the law, which is known and
regulated in a predictable manner for citizens. In other words, the State must also
operate according to the law, in compliance with the rules of law.”
The principle of legal certainty gives rise to various legislative principles (which
determine, among other things, the basic conditions for the validity of legislation)
and to so-called procedural guarantees (e.g. the right to access justice or guarantees
in criminal proceedings), which are also essential for respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms. It is no coincidence that an increasing number of states
are enshrining in their constitutions the most important provisions necessary for
their functioning.’ This also reflects a choice of values. At the supranational level,
the rules of international law‘ (us cogens), which require unconditional application,
are of similar importance.
The importance of the precise definition and application of these concepts in
jurisprudence would be difficult to overestimate. This is why including the terms
sustainable development’ and Sustainability’ within environmental law has been a
problem for decades and in fact remains unresolved. The academic literature is far
from unanimous on how it should be viewed: as a principle (including a political
or legal principle), as an objective, or perhaps as some other element that plays a
role but is nevertheless central to the legal system as a whole.’ What is certain is
that its role in enforcing legislation is very limited, in contrast with principles of
environmental law (prevention, precautions, the polluter pays, etc.), which are also
not enforceable per se, but which can play an important role in the interpretation
and application of legislation (Scotford 2017: 192; Sands — Peel 2018: 9).
Law is inherently anthropocentric’ in nature, in that it regulates human behavior
in the context of legal relations, and the people behind the lawmaking and law
enforcement (judicial) bodies are the people who operate them. Legislation is
addressed not only to natural persons, but also to companies, NGOs and other
legal persons, which, as legal entities established and recognised by law, are also
represented by human beings. The titular question of Christopher Stone’s 1972
book (Should Trees Have Standing?) still requires an answer today (Stone 2010),
particularly with regard to the practical applicability of the so-called ‘biocentric’
approach. Interestingly, the law has only gone so far as to say that the Romans
Article B), paragraph (1).
56/1991 AB [Constitutional Court] ruling. ABH 1991. 454-456.
This is why national legal systems prescribe special provisions for amending the constitution.
These include, for example, the right of peoples to self-determination, the prohibition of violence,
genocide, torture and slavery, and the fundamental rules of international humanitarian law.
Bow Ne
Bándi, Gyula 2013. A fenntarthatóság értelmezésének egyes jogi szempontjai [Some legal aspects
of the interpretation of sustainability]. Akadémiai nagydoktori thesis, PPKE (http://real-d.mtak.
hu/651/.