Oldal 127 [127]
self-consciousness. (Ibid p.102.) To describe ít in a very Hegelian
mode, this is the momentthat one consciousness becomes aware of
and then reflects on the meaning of the other consciousness. The
baby does not see only the rattle but the other person (its mother,
for example) who gave it the rattle. Its consciousness reflects on the
other consciousness. This is the moment that self-consciousness
comes into being. From this point, one self-consciousness con¬
fronts the other. (Ibid p.108.) It is completely apparent that the
Hegelian self-consciousness’s independence and dependence can be
observed even in the mother-child relationship. This is, of course,
(also) opposition. This includes conflict but also reconciliation.
Humans have to remain alive but also become humans, says the
outstanding Alexandre Kojéve. (Kojéve 947. p.101.)
2. The other is one who differs from the particular self, either
voluntarily or by force. Distinction is the determining factor which
also embodies the promise of moving beyond, since the same is
a mere possibility (SUvaptc, potentia), reality (évépyeia, actu)
is created by differentiation. This is creation, or as it is usually
expressed the actual moment of true birth, when possibility can
become reality.
3. The alien is one whose home is distant, even if they never go
anywhere, even if they carry their sense of homelessness in them¬
selves. I, as the same, feel at home in my own space. But where is
the alien? Far from me. Outside. If they are distant, the problem
comes from them coming closer. They disturb me by wanting
something different. It disturbs me that they might force that on
me, too. That disturbs me, and so the aliens themselves become
disturbing. And where else is the alien? In me. Inside. If it is inside
me and that disturbs me, then the final solution is to step out of life
(Narcissus). At the same time, the alien cannot be judged purely as
53 See Self-Sufficiency and Non-Self-Sufficiency of Self-Consciousness.