Oldal 80 [80]
The problem of freedom creates tension in both generally and
individually, especially within a specific group. This comes from
the relationship between the two, i.e., the conflict between the
general ethical imperative and individual moral conviction. Let
us consider a proposed law that stamp collectors should be perse¬
cuted in a country. On the other hand, I particularly love stamps,
and I collect them myself. The general and the individual will be
in conflict with each other. The question is: how can the tension
between the two be eliminated? Can this tension be eliminated at
all? Can the contradiction? It is to do so that Schelling reframes
the Kantian categorical imperative, which in Kant is phrased as
“act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold
good as a principle of universal legislation”. (Kant, 2018. Book I.
§.7., Kant 1977.)
That is, if you have the opportunity to steal, although you could
steal you by no means would want there to be a general rule saying
everybody should steal. This would be contrary to the urgings of
common sense: if the general rule is for everyone to steal, that could
negatively affect you. People could steal from you, too. This con¬
tradicts common sense. Thus, I behave rightly when I act in a way
that can be made a general rule. Indeed, “do not steal” as opposed
to “steal” can indeed become a general rule. This is true even if
I myself steal occasionally, when I can. This can be transformed
into a moral principle. (S.W. I. 45.§. )?* This formulation seeks to
bring something new to the Kantian categorical imperative in many
respects, by emphasizing “action,” namely, by stating that action
has an effect on the moral world and thus assumes the co-action
of the majority. Co-action is the highest level of communication.
This is because, even though it is about the relationship between godly and
human freedom, at its core it is about internal and external limitations
without which freedom would be completely meaningless.
36 Neue Deduktion des Naturrechts (1795.) The title stresses the importance of
natural law. I am convinced that when we speak of any positive right, it
defies understanding if it has no basis in natural law. I will return to this
later when I discuss G. Radbruch.