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but themselves. The finding of fault in the other is, above all, the
surest sign of weakness in the self, the complete lack of freedom
of the imagination, because only in the world of the imagination
can one be perfectly free. It is as though this were exactly what
Kierkegaard were writing about when he said,
The philistine-bourgeois mentality lacks every qualification of spirit
and is completely wrapped up in probability, within which possibility
finds its small corner; therefore it lacks the possibility of becoming
aware of God. Bereft of imagination, as the philistine-bourgeois
always is, whether alehouse keeper or prime minister, he lives within
a certain trivial compendium of experiences as to how things go,
what is possible, what usually happens. (Kierkegaard 1983, pp.83-84.)
Without imagination there is no self, and without that people
can finally be at peace. The move to unify in Hegel comes about
through reconciliation (Verséhnung), as was previously mentioned.
Unification could also happen as it does for the Greeks when Eros
combines that which has been divided magically, just as in the
Hegelian world the spirit reconciles contradiction and dissolves
into discovering a new world. It is as though we were hearing Ovid:
Her prayer reached the gods. Now the entwined bodies of the two were
joined together, and one form covered both. Just as when someone
grafts a twig into the bark, they see both grow joined together, and
their choices carefully, because afterwards they can blame none but them¬
selves. But humans are nevertheless fallible creatures: “And when he had
spoken, he who had the first choice came forward and in a moment chose the
greatest tyranny; his mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality, he
had not thought out the whole matter before he chose, and did not at first sight
perceive that he was fated, among other evils, to devour his own children.
But when he had time to reflect, and saw what was in the lot, he began to
beat his breast and lament over his choice, forgetting the proclamation of
the prophet; for, instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself,
he accused chance and the gods, and everything rather than himself.” See
Plato: The Republic Book X.