Seite 41 [41]
Or, at theological level:
1. the Word;
2. the Body;
3. that in which the two are united.
In the Christian sense, this person is Christ, he who is both divine
(Word) and human (Body), both perfect and imperfect, infinite
and finite, eternal and temporal. He dies and is resurrected. His
death is the most human thing, for only a human can die, and
his resurrection is proof of his divine (infinite, eternal, perfect)
nature. Neither is the human who is an individual different: they
are perfect and imperfect at the same time. Of course, Jesus is
also the Son of Man - and the Son of God. Without these three
moves, we cannot talk about the individual, the intelligence or the
self, and only the self, the individual, can be free, and that is what
is really at stake. One who is ready think, doubt, ask questions,
and accept risk independently is an individual. The rest are just
“objects.” Or “tools.”
The succession of moves in Hegelian philosophy, narrowing it
down to logic, goes as follows:
However, self-consciousness is in fact the reflection out of the
being of the sensuous and perceived world and is essentially the
return from out of otherness. As self-consciousness, it is movement,
but while self-consciousness only distinguishes itself from itself
as itself, that difference as an otherness is, to itself, immediately
sublated. There simply is no difference, and self-consciousness
is only the motionless tautology of “I am I.” While, to itself, the
difference does not also have the shape of being, it is not self-con¬
sciousness. (PoS. p.103.)
The move of self-consciousness repeats that which takes place
in the consciousness when this knowledge is given existing status.
Thus, the difference in the self-consciousness ceases, which is to
say, , however, what has now emerged is something which did not