Oldal 40 [40]
OCR
that into account we are talking about a self-limiting move, which is important because the individual is created by the self-restriction of the “I.” We have known since Goethe that there is no humanity; there have always been and will always be just humans. The question of individuum and dividuum concerns not only philosophy, but also the whole of European culture. What is inseparable (in-dividuum) and what is divisible (di-viduum)? Who wants and dares to be himself is an individuum, that which is not divided? The fact that this comes with thousands of dangers hardly needs to be mentioned. On the other hand, a “dividuum” is a dogmatic person who is not strong in themselves, has no or little will, who has given away their individuality, and who/which is fit for no other purpose but being used, no different from how we use an axe or fork. In all cases, its ‘autonomy’ depends on how it is used. Its very existence is dependency. At the same time, it is no less dangerous, but actually even more dangerous, than a great evildoer. It is like the slave of Turnus Herdonius, who served his master gladly, but betrayed him at the first word of the tyrant Tarquinius Superbus and watched his lord being drowned with requisite cheer. Superbus had a saying that is eternally relevant: Oderint, dum metuant - hate me, only fear me. When there is a lack of self-consciousness, it will be replaced by something or someone other. Here we find another “other.” Accordingly, in the act of self-consciousness, three moves can be distinguished: 1. The unified “I,” which is to say the original identity of the subject-object (before the “Urteil” inthe Hölderlin sense); 2. The self-differentiation of the “I”, the duality of the observer and the observed, that is, when the “I” becomes both a subject and itself an object; 3. The reflexive move of the “I” by which the two coincide, the oneness of the observer and the observed (intelligence).
