Oldal 40 [40]
that into account we are talking about a self-limiting move, which
is important because the individual is created by the self-restric¬
tion of the “I.”
We have known since Goethe that there is no humanity; there
have always been and will always be just humans. The question of
individuum and dividuum concerns not only philosophy, but also
the whole of European culture. What is inseparable (in-dividuum)
and what is divisible (di-viduum)? Who wants and dares to be him¬
self is an individuum, that which is not divided? The fact that this
comes with thousands of dangers hardly needs to be mentioned.
On the other hand, a “dividuum” is a dogmatic person who is not
strong in themselves, has no or little will, who has given away their
individuality, and who/which is fit for no other purpose but being
used, no different from how we use an axe or fork. In all cases, its
‘autonomy’ depends on how it is used. Its very existence is depend¬
ency. At the same time, it is no less dangerous, but actually even
more dangerous, than a great evildoer. It is like the slave of Turnus
Herdonius, who served his master gladly, but betrayed him at the
first word of the tyrant Tarquinius Superbus and watched his lord
being drowned with requisite cheer. Superbus had a saying that
is eternally relevant: Oderint, dum metuant - hate me, only fear
me. When there is a lack of self-consciousness, it will be replaced
by something or someone other. Here we find another “other.”
Accordingly, in the act of self-consciousness, three moves can
be distinguished:
1. The unified “I,” which is to say the original identity of the
subject-object (before the “Urteil” inthe Hölderlin sense);
2. The self-differentiation of the “I”, the duality of the observer
and the observed, that is, when the “I” becomes both a subject and
itself an object;
3. The reflexive move of the “I” by which the two coincide, the
oneness of the observer and the observed (intelligence).