sciousness, the free act is the distinction between the thinker and
the thought, which at the same time creates identity. It creates a
concept that in its genesis is none other than the “I.” Thus, the “I”
can be defined as the same discovered in difference. So, the “I” is
a pure act, knowledge that has become actual, which is not only
knowledge but also action. This unity is expressed by intellectual
perception, above purely sensory perception. Its synthetic nature
is also demonstrated in the fact that it is cause and effect, creator
and creator, subject and object, as a result of the doubling of the
self (“Ich ist Ich”). In connection to this, Schelling notes, similarly
to the above, that the judgment is a priori synthetic because the
“T” has no other predicate but itself. There is no other predicate,
even that “something exists,” because the “I” is existence itself,
which is to say we would enter into unnecessary repetition with a
statement like this.
If we take Schelling’s arguments further, we can say, in Aris¬
totle’s words, that the “I” is pure reality (evépyetx) because it is
originally unlimited, underlying (önokeiuevov, subiectus, zu
Grunde liegend), limitation. (S.W. 1.3. p 382., CPR. p.163.) ” Itis
self-limitation in that the subject itself positions something oppo¬
site itself (obiectus, Gegen-stand”°). The two terms also express this:
subject=serves as the basis for something, object=stands opposite.
The question is: what is the basis of this limitation? As we have
(and will) say in the case of freedom, there is no freedom without
limitation, just as there is no unrestricted “I’, since the unrestricted
“T’ would preclude all other possibilities. The resulting self would
bea sort of quasi-god, which is nonsense. Therefore, it is necessary
to limit the “I.” But nothing can restrict the “I” but itself, so taking