Oldal 30 [30]
can also use the Book of John to understand Hegelian philosophy.
It is no different in content from other creation stories, but íts use
of the “Word” raises it to the level of philosophy:
1. In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and
the Word was God.
2 The same was in the beginning with God.
3 All things were made by him: and without him was made nothing
that was made.
4 In him was life, and the life was the light of men.
5 And the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness did not comp¬
rehend it.
(John. 1.1-5)
Philosophy explains the splitting of the Word starting with the
general form of judgment (Urteil) (S. - c - P.). It is important to
examine the nature of judgment because this is what performs
separation and connection. In the case above, the speaking of
a word (Word) is itself a separation. And, of course, it is also a
connection. Why?
As early as Kant we find a distinction between certain forms of
judgment (analytical, synthetic; therefore, many important figures
of German idealism could not avoid this question. Judgment: the
house (S) is brown (P). (The “c” is the copula, that is, the “to be”
verb. Or this man (S) is (c) intelligent (P). (They are both synthetic
judgments, but that is not important here.) This is most accurately
described by Kant:
In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is
thought (if I consider only affirmative judgments, since the applica¬
tion to negative ones is easy) this relation is possible in two different
ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something
that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies entirely outside
the concept A, though to be sure it stands in connection with it. In
the first case I call the judgment analytic, in the second synthetic.
(CPR p.141., Kants Werke 1977. IV.p.20.)