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ingeniously captures the essence of the thing. In his later works,
he refers to the self as a relation (Forhold). (SKS 11. p. 129.) And
that is what it is. Hegel formulates this in the following (slightly
more complex, but crystal clear) manner:
In itself that life is indeed an unalloyed sameness and unity with
itself, since in such a life there is neither anything serious in this
otherness and alienation, nor in overcoming this alienation. However,
this in-itself is abstract universality, in which its nature, which is to
be for itself, and the self-movement of the form are both left out of
view. (PoS. p.13., PdG. p.24.)
Identity is thus contentlessness, that which cannot be made sense
of by itself. The three principles that then follow through all of
Hegelian philosophy are as follows:
- Same (an sich)
- Other (ftir sich)
- Same (an- und für sich)?
Looking at the Hegelian example, these correspond to
1. The seed (the self, proceeding from the self),
2. The seedling (the immediately opposing other, even while
the two assume each others existence),
3. The mature plant (abolished opposition = new identity).
That is, the seedling denies the seed (the seed “dies” in the seed¬
ling), and the plant eliminates both the seed and the seedling
while preserving the essence of both (there is no plant without
seed and seedling). This is the topos of preserving-while-ending
(Aufhebung, sublation, see to the terminology of German idealism
Schelling 2000 pp.109), which, while important insight, is a purely
theoretical construct. In the states between their transitions, the
Hegelian concept of “mediation” emerges, which Kierkegaard will
later call the magic magical tool of Hegelian philosophy. This is
9 Initself, for itself, in and for itself.