Oldal 184 [184]
GERD VAN RIEL
the One-Many and the Many-One, in order to explain how multiplicity can
derive from the existence of the One (Damascius, DP II, 39, 8-25). Ihat is
hardly the language of a sceptic. Ultimately, he positions the Ineffable as the
first principle above and beyond the One, and then of course he has to guestion
its nature as a principle, as something entirely separate from the system
cannot be seen as a principle in the literal sense (which is the opening guestion
of the De Principiis: Damascius, DP I, 1, 4-2, 20). It is true that Damascius
also emphasizes the fact that all discursive language about the intelligible
world (which by definition transcends the discursive intellect) can only be an
“indication” (Evöeıdıc), and that we should not “count the intelligible on our
fingers” (Damascius, DP III 136, 8-9). In that sense, too, one could maintain
that he reverses \oyoc on the level of the intelligible. But that does not do away
with the fact that the discursive analyses are taken seriously as indications. In
other words, they are still the best way to explain to our own mind how the
intelligible world operates.
4. MYSTICISM AND “OPEN METAPHYSICS”
Where does this access to mysticism leave us, finally, in our philosophical quest
for understanding the world? I believe it works only in an open metaphysical
system. The term “open metaphysics” usually refers to an anti-dogmatic
metaphysics that does not accept one single truth claim and which thus
allows for diverse and manifold answers to metaphysical questions. In doing
so, it is thoroughly immanentistic and tends to dismiss transcendence, as
the recognition of transcendence always seems to lead to the acceptance of
an absolute, transcendent realm. Or, as Jan Patocka formulates it:
Transcendence is, fatally and irreversibly, converted into a transcendent, supra¬
worldly reality, a transcendent divinity.”
I allow myself here to give the term “open metaphysics” a different meaning,
based on the way in which a metaphysical system relates to its own
dogmatic principles, while at the same time accepting the fundamental
role of transcendence. | take it that the claims of an open metaphysics can
be exclusive and dogmatic; the openness depends on the cognitive status
of the metaphysical principles in place. A “closed metaphysics” would be
a metaphysical system that allows one to have a final access to the truth,
such as Aristotelian metaphysics. It should in principle be possible to grasp
4° Jan Patoëka, Sebrané spisy, 1: Pece o dusi, | [Collected Works, vol. 1: Care of the Soul, Part I],
Praha, Oikumene, 1996, 311, quoted by Johann P. Arnason, The Idea of Negative Platonism:
Jan Patocka’s Critique and Recovery of Metaphysics, Thesis Eleven, 90 (2007), 6-26 [here: p. 12].
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