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GERD VAN RIEL The negations are thus designed, in their specific order, as indications of the order of procession. In other words: those attributes that are negated about the One can be affirmed about the realms that posit themselves beneath the first principle. The key to the order in which these attributes come into existence is provided by the second hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides, in which the negations of the first are taken up as affirmations. If it makes no sense to say that the One is, as stated in the negations of the first hypothesis, then this means that being is something that emanates from the One, i.e., as an affirmation in the second hypothesis. That allows Proclus to state that the affirmations are produced by the negations: As the One is the cause of everything, so are the negations the cause of the affirmations.’ Thus, the Neoplatonists’ via negativa presupposes a clear-cut and precisely ordered via affirmativa. If the negative way were the only one, then it would make no difference what one negates. One might say of the highest principle that is it not being, not intelligible, but equally that it is not mud or tooth or worm, etc. There would be no urge to negate one thing rather than another. Yet in a via negativa the importance of the order of the negations is paramount because of its link with the via affirmativa. No one will negate that God is dust-like, as it makes no sense to affirm the dustlikeness of God in the first place. We need a clear succession of those terms that are eligible for being negated, ina logical order which reflects the ontological position of the realities indicated by them. Those realities are the bearers of the affirmations of the attributes that are denied of the One, in a strict parallel between negations and affirmations. The affirmations are summed up in the Parmenides, whereby each of them constitutes a distinct level of divine existence. Despite the emphasis that is put on the insufficiency of our concepts, this mechanism of the relationship between negations and affirmations indicates the importance of our concepts after all. The negations and affirmations in the Parmenides constitute a logical and ontological hierarchy of those concepts that bring us to the point where the rational account undermines itself, which we would never reach without the affirmations. This means that, ultimately, the Neoplatonists’ mystical experience (in the ineffability of the highest principle) relies on their philosophical analysis (in affirmative theology leading up to the negations). We shall have to come back to this. 7 Proclus, In Parm. V1 1075, 14-15. See also In Parm. V1 1075, 26-29 and 1076, 23-24; TP II 10, 63, 8-17. + 178 + Daréczi-Sepsi-Vassänyi_Initiation_155x240.indb 178 6 2020.06.15. 11:04:19
