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MYSTICISM AND RATIONALITY. A NEOPLATONIC PERSPECTIVE impossible; or that knowledge connects to the intelligible; and likewise with all other forms of cognition. So, if there would be a rational account of the ineffable, it would constantly undermine itself and be in conflict with itself." Damascius reiterates this, by saying that in itself, the One should be called “nothing” rather than “one” (Damascius, DP I, 6, 16-8, 5), and he applies the same to the ineffability of the Ineffable (which in his system transcends the level of the One): Perhaps the absolutely ineffable is ineffable in the sense that one cannot even state of it that it is ineffable. (Damascius, DP I, 10, 22-24) If we want to approach the ineffable principle, it can only be reached through a mystical experience. As Proclus points out: We must honour this cause by silence, and by the unity that precedes silence, so that it may shine upon our souls the appropriate share of the mystic goal. (Proclus, TP Ill 7, 30, 7-10) But if the negations mean nothing, then why do we need them? In answering this, Proclus gives an interesting and important clue about the connection between negations and affirmations. First of all, the negations are designed to indicate, ex effectibus, how reality derives from the ineffable principle. This principle is so powerful that, just by being there (1& eivaı uövw napäyeıv, Proclus, In Parm. VII, 1167, 30), reality produces itself as an emanation from it. It is like a compressed existence of everything at once, which is gradually decompressed and plurified so as to constitute reality. The negations may not be determiners of the first principle itself, yet they do indicate the realms that first derive their existence from the ineffable One: As far as I am concerned, I have the impression that by this second mode [i.e., the way of negations], Plato reveals the procession of all other things out of the First, and primordially the procession of the divine realms. On the basis of that, the First is transcendent to all the things it produces, because a cause always surpasses its effects. And on the basis of that, it is nothing of all things, as everything proceeds from it. (Proclus, TP II 5, 37, 19-25) Proclus, TP II 10, 64, 2-9: Kai Bavuaotdv odôëv TÖ űppnrov TŰ hóyw yvwpiCerv édgéhovrag eic TO &ôbvvatov repiayelv TÖV hóyov, érei kai nűca YvÓoIG TO HNŐÉV AT ÔLAPÉPOVTL YVWOTY ovvanrtouevn TMV Eavtijc antddAvOt Svvautv- Kai yap tMv alodnoıv ei TOD EmtoTHTod Aéyotpev, Eavrnv Avamprioeı, Kal TMV ErLOTNUNV Ei TOD vonToDd, Kal ExdoTHV TOV yvWoewv: WoTE Kai ei Aoyoc ein Tod dppritov, TEepi EavtT@ kataPadrdAdpevoc ovdéev mavetat kai Mpdc Eavtov Srapayetat. + 177 + Daréczi-Sepsi-Vassänyi_Initiation_155x240.indb 177 6 2020.06.15. 11:04:19
