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MYSTICISM AND RATIONALITY. A NEOPLATONIC PERSPECTIVE
impossible; or that knowledge connects to the intelligible; and likewise with all
other forms of cognition. So, if there would be a rational account of the ineffable,
it would constantly undermine itself and be in conflict with itself."
Damascius reiterates this, by saying that in itself, the One should be called
“nothing” rather than “one” (Damascius, DP I, 6, 16-8, 5), and he applies
the same to the ineffability of the Ineffable (which in his system transcends
the level of the One):
Perhaps the absolutely ineffable is ineffable in the sense that one cannot even state
of it that it is ineffable. (Damascius, DP I, 10, 22-24)
If we want to approach the ineffable principle, it can only be reached through
a mystical experience. As Proclus points out:
We must honour this cause by silence, and by the unity that precedes silence, so
that it may shine upon our souls the appropriate share of the mystic goal. (Proclus,
TP Ill 7, 30, 7-10)
But if the negations mean nothing, then why do we need them? In answering
this, Proclus gives an interesting and important clue about the connection
between negations and affirmations. First of all, the negations are designed
to indicate, ex effectibus, how reality derives from the ineffable principle.
This principle is so powerful that, just by being there (1& eivaı uövw napäyeıv,
Proclus, In Parm. VII, 1167, 30), reality produces itself as an emanation from
it. It is like a compressed existence of everything at once, which is gradually
decompressed and plurified so as to constitute reality. The negations may not
be determiners of the first principle itself, yet they do indicate the realms that
first derive their existence from the ineffable One:
As far as I am concerned, I have the impression that by this second mode [i.e.,
the way of negations], Plato reveals the procession of all other things out of the First,
and primordially the procession of the divine realms. On the basis of that, the First
is transcendent to all the things it produces, because a cause always surpasses its
effects. And on the basis of that, it is nothing of all things, as everything proceeds
from it. (Proclus, TP II 5, 37, 19-25)
Proclus, TP II 10, 64, 2-9: Kai Bavuaotdv odôëv TÖ űppnrov TŰ hóyw yvwpiCerv édgéhovrag eic
TO &ôbvvatov repiayelv TÖV hóyov, érei kai nűca YvÓoIG TO HNŐÉV AT ÔLAPÉPOVTL YVWOTY
ovvanrtouevn TMV Eavtijc antddAvOt Svvautv- Kai yap tMv alodnoıv ei TOD EmtoTHTod Aéyotpev,
Eavrnv Avamprioeı, Kal TMV ErLOTNUNV Ei TOD vonToDd, Kal ExdoTHV TOV yvWoewv: WoTE Kai ei
Aoyoc ein Tod dppritov, TEepi EavtT@ kataPadrdAdpevoc ovdéev mavetat kai Mpdc Eavtov Srapayetat.
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