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EQUAL RIGHTS BETWEEN SEXES
Maritain,’ in order to answer this, we first have to separate the ontological and
gnoseological study of natural law. Following this line of thought we can claim
that human rights, the right to life, ie. natural rights, have always existed, are
of the same age as mankind, but unlike positive rights, it took effort to fully
realize them. Social development, the development and cognition of man, an
even deeper knowledge of ourselves may have been the factors that eventu¬
ally led us to recognize the ever-existing fundamental principles of natural
law, which have been transformed into laws stated expressis verbis in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.®
However, there were aspirations to something similar much earlier in time.
Classical equality was, for example, reflected in the ideas of the 17th-century
philosopher Nicolas de Condorcet, who described the relationship between
the “discovery” of human rights and the legislative power of majority decision¬
making in his work titled Esquisse. He also addressed the issue of women’s
equality, which he considered a moral evidence.’ “One of the most important
achievements of the human spirit, in terms of overall prosperity, is the complete
destruction of prejudice that have created legal inequalities between the two
sexes, with devastating consequences for the favoured party.”
Despite its early appearance and the later — initially less successful — cod¬
ification of women’s suffrage as a result of emancipation movements, the first
significant document to ban discrimination on a large scale was not published
until the 20th century. The United Nations General Assembly accepted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948, primarily to
ensure that crimes against humanity committed during World War II — such
as the Shoah — can never happen again.
We need to note that the UN Charter - preceding this document — had
made an expressis verbis declaration on human rights on several points, but
it was only about equality in general, also stating the prohibition of racial,
gender and religious discrimination."
a
Maritain, J.: A személy jogai. A politikai humanizmus, in Frivaldszky, J. (ed.): Természetjog.
Szöveggyűjtemény, Budapest, Szent István Társulat, 2006, 90—92; see also Maritain, guoted by
Turgonyi, Z.: A természetjog rehabilitálása felé — Gondolatok Frivaldszky János új könyvének
kapcsán, Jogelméleti szemle, 2012/1, 173.
About this issue see my article: Takács, I.: Az emberi jogok lehetnek-e univerzálisak? A kul¬
turális relativizmus és az univerzalizmus konfliktusa az emberi jogok filozófiai és gyakorlati
megközelítéseiben [Can human rights be universal? Cultural Relativism versus Universalism,
philosophical and practical approaches in the context of Human Rights], Jogelméleti Szemle,
2021/3, 84-108.
Ludassy, M.: A jövő nemzedékek iránti felelősség Condorcet koncepciója, Magyar Filozófiai
Szemle, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2012, 9—14.
1° Condorcet, quoted by Ludassy: A jövö nemzedekek, 9-14.
1 Cf. Kovacs, P.: Nemzetközi jog, Budapest, Osiris, 2016, 369-377.
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