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Kamila Baraniecka-Olszewska
promote them as originals, never. Ihats not an idea of everything, but to make
a good photo, yes (Photographer, male, age ca 40, Poznan, 2015).
The “crisis of representation” is evident here, but the idea of reenacting pho¬
tography is to go beyond it, to simulate the past in order to add something to the
present knowledge about it, but also to express the photographer’s feelings about
the past.
That [image in a photograph] is not my vision of reenactment. It is my vision of
the past. But it is a vision which starts in my head. It is mine. Of course, I read
a lot, I browse original pictures etc., but it is my vision of the past, constructed
of what I have in my head (Photographer, male, age ca 40, Poznari, 2015).
To some degree it is consistent with White's thesis that history exists only in
representations—for example, narrations (1973; Domariska 2005). Images of the
past could be recognized as another narration or an interpretation that does not
have to be identical with the original (or with the original interpretation of) war
photography. Nevertheless, we have discussed some doubt regarding whether pho¬
tography can constitute a narration. White (1988) and, earlier, Rosenstone (1988),
in their articles, focused mostly on film as a form of historiophoty, and they did
not examine whether images themselves, without context and additional informa¬
tion (e.g. captions, title, description), can be regarded as historical narrations. This
problem was dealt with, however, by the theorists of photography.
There is still a conviction that a photograph itself, as an image, is deprived of
meaning (Berger 1999: 75; also Sontag 2010). Pictures themselves do not talk,
they just register. To “talk” they need additional narration. Berger makes a distinc¬
tion between private and public photographs. He argues that private pictures are
perceived within a continuous context from which photography extracts the im¬
age, but meanings belong to that context (Berger 1999: 76). The situation with
public photographs is rather different: viewers look at photos who have nothing
to do with the photographs and their meanings directly. Information contained
in such photographs is deprived of lived experience. Public pictures in this respect
are perceived as strikingly Other. Berger believes that this is the reason why photos
can be used and interpreted in any possible way (Ibid.: 76). The separation of pho¬
tographs from human experience influences their optional perception (see Ibid.:
82-83), since the photos contain only information and no meaning (Ibid.: 76).
It seems thus that this issue of public photography has a close connection to
reenactment photography as well. The otherness of its re-created content is evident:
WWII exceeds the range of experiences of most people living contemporarily. Al¬
though Berger suggests that a certain kind of de-otherising of such photography
might be achieved by introducing those images into human memory and creating
a particular, continuous attitude towards the past within the viewer; he remains