was more temperamental than the one of the Finns, Jalava surmised (Jalava 1876b:
4-5, 9). Historically viewed, the main difference between Hungary and Finland
for Jalava was that the peasantry of Hungary was still enslaved; whereas, Finnish
peasants had enjoyed considerable “freedom” already under an otherwise “oppres¬
sive” Swedish rule (pre-1809). In Hungary, the nobles had fought against each
other at the expense of the serfs, which had led to “uprisings, persecution, murder
and destruction” (Jalava 1883:7). However, in the nineteenth century, each nation
had risen to realize its own national consciousness: the Hungarians during the re¬
form movement and the Finns, the fennoman one. Jalava picked out Széchenyi and
later Deák (the architect of the 1867 compromise) as the main (moderate) heroes,
and castigated Kossuth as a French-type revolutionary (“political jester”) given to
excesses of “national pride,” too typical of Hungarians and repulsive to common¬
sensical and moderate fennomen (who believed that the position of the Finns could
also be improved by compromises with the Russian government, and thus dimin¬
ish the dominance of the Swedes in Finland) (Jalava 1876b: 40-55, 59). However
much Jalava admired “noble” Hungarians, he often balanced this evaluation by
pointing to other peculiarities of their character (ill. 30).
Although favorable natural conditions had made them “honest, open- and noble¬
minded, enthusiastically patriotic, careless of sorrows and misfortunes, valiant in
war (two imperial armies were needed to beat them in 1849), chivalrous in manners,
sharp and splendid speakers,” they were too often “over-ambitious, proud, boastful
and ostentatious” (Jalava 1882: 12). They liked pomp and luxury, they were not
prone to painstaking efforts and their enthusiasm was soon exhausted. They were
usually deep in debt as German and Jewish bankers and usurers became enriched at
their expense. When thinking big, they imagined that Hungary could become one
of the great powers of Europe, and ready to fulfill its mission to lead the peoples of
the Carpathian Basin (Jalava 1876b: 60, 65), but at the same time they lived beyond
their means, were easily corrupted amusing themselves as they could, and enjoying
ease and comfort. Most striking to Jalava was their national egotism: “Outside Hun¬
gary there is no life, but if there is, it is just a little” (Jalava 1876b: 324). On the posi¬
tive side, it egged them on to sacrifice their fortunes and lives for their country. This
Jalava regarded as exemplary to his “sullen” compatriots who should learn to use
it against the svecomen (Swedish-minded, dominant minority in Finland). On the
negative side, such an egotism made Hungarians scorn the Others, most notably the
Slav minorities (“Slovak is not a man”: Jalava 1876b: 326), the Romanians, and the
Jews. In politics, it offended the principles of tolerance and moderation, and Jalava
was shocked that even Görgei, the general who laid down arms in face of an inevi¬
table defeat in the war of liberation in 1848—1849, whom Jalava met and respected,
considered Slavs too uncivilized for home rule. In Jalava’s vision, Austria-Hungary
could have been reformed toward federation, but the Hungarians (not to say any¬
thing of the Habsburgs), “hot-blooded” as they were, exaggerated everything bad
in Others and good in themselves, and their politics was spoiled by too much talk¬