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ISTVÁN STUMPE application to be in fact aimed at reviewing the content ofthe Fourth Amendment, it rejected the application on the grounds that it did not fall within its competence. An essential critical element of the incisive dissenting opinions written to the decision was that the legal validity of the amendments to the Fundamental Law can only be assessed on the basis of the rules valid and effective at the time of the adoption of the challenged law. The unconstitutionality of the amendment should not have been assessed on the basis of the criteria set out in the amendment currently on the agenda, because an amendment to the Fundamental Law cannot determine the basis for reviewing its own compliance with the Fundamental Law. This can only be done on the basis of the provisions of the Fundamental Law previously in force. Otherwise, any amendment to the Fundamental Law could exclude the possibility of its own revision, and, moreover, the limits of substantive amendment set out in the Fundamental Law could be neutralized by an amendment to the Fundamental Law.”° There is no doubt that during the constitutional review of the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law, the Constitutional Court acted in a self-restraining way compared to its previous decisions, and the division of the body is well reflected in the large number of dissenting opinions and concurring opinions. SUMMARY Due to its place in the system of exercise of constitutional power, the Constitutional Court plays a special role in the constitutional control of the legislative activity of the legislative and executive power. This constitutional responsibility acquires special significance in situations where a governing force has a twothirds, constitutional-amending majority in parliament. The cases where the government is forced to make a decision (crisis legislation, international pressure, vote-maximizing requirements) can often lead to situations where fundamental constitutional rights and values may be bracketed in order to achieve short-term goals. In addition to the normative provision in the Fundamental Law regarding the division of power, the constitutional requirement of the co-operation of powers must be also taken into account. All this cannot mean that the judicial power does not exercise judicial control over the administration and the Constitutional Court does not exercise constitutional supervision over the other branches of power. 20 The Constitutional Court Decision and the dissenting opinions are presented in detail: Vincze, Attila, Az Alkotmánybíróság határozata az Alaptörvény negyedik módosításáról. Az alkotmánymódosítás alkotmánybírósági kontrollja [Decision of the Constitutional Court on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law. Constitutional Court control of constitutional amendment], Jogesetek Magyardzata 3 (2013), 3-12. + 428 «
