Seite 430 [430]
ISTVÁN STUMPE
application to be in fact aimed at reviewing the content ofthe Fourth Amendment,
it rejected the application on the grounds that it did not fall within its competence.
An essential critical element of the incisive dissenting opinions written to the
decision was that the legal validity of the amendments to the Fundamental Law
can only be assessed on the basis of the rules valid and effective at the time of
the adoption of the challenged law. The unconstitutionality of the amendment
should not have been assessed on the basis of the criteria set out in the amendment
currently on the agenda, because an amendment to the Fundamental Law cannot
determine the basis for reviewing its own compliance with the Fundamental
Law. This can only be done on the basis of the provisions of the Fundamental
Law previously in force. Otherwise, any amendment to the Fundamental Law
could exclude the possibility of its own revision, and, moreover, the limits of
substantive amendment set out in the Fundamental Law could be neutralized
by an amendment to the Fundamental Law.”° There is no doubt that during the
constitutional review of the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law, the
Constitutional Court acted in a self-restraining way compared to its previous
decisions, and the division of the body is well reflected in the large number of
dissenting opinions and concurring opinions.
SUMMARY
Due to its place in the system of exercise of constitutional power, the Constitutional
Court plays a special role in the constitutional control of the legislative activity
of the legislative and executive power. This constitutional responsibility
acquires special significance in situations where a governing force has a two¬
thirds, constitutional-amending majority in parliament. The cases where the
government is forced to make a decision (crisis legislation, international pressure,
vote-maximizing requirements) can often lead to situations where fundamental
constitutional rights and values may be bracketed in order to achieve short-term
goals. In addition to the normative provision in the Fundamental Law regarding
the division of power, the constitutional requirement of the co-operation of powers
must be also taken into account. All this cannot mean that the judicial power does
not exercise judicial control over the administration and the Constitutional Court
does not exercise constitutional supervision over the other branches of power.
20 The Constitutional Court Decision and the dissenting opinions are presented in detail:
Vincze, Attila, Az Alkotmánybíróság határozata az Alaptörvény negyedik módosításáról.
Az alkotmánymódosítás alkotmánybírósági kontrollja [Decision of the Constitutional
Court on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law. Constitutional Court control
of constitutional amendment], Jogesetek Magyardzata 3 (2013), 3-12.
+ 428 «