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ISTVÁN STUMPE Procedure directly applicable to the case manifestly violated. Consequently, the Constitutional Court did not establish invalidity under public law, and it rejected the motions to that effect.’ Nevertheless, as a constitutional requirement, it stated only in the reasoning that the legislative procedure must comply with the provisions laid down in the Rules of Procedure, and that, even in the event of uncertainty as to the interpretation of the provisions of the Rules of Procedure, thus of the provisions relating to the exceptional rules for extraordinary meetings, as a precondition for the exercise of the rights of the members of parliament, sufficient time should be allowed for thorough scrutiny and discussion in the meetings of committees and in a plenary meeting. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS — EXTENDED INVALIDITY UNDER PUBLIC LAW Upon the initiative of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, the Constitutional Court subjected the Transitional Provisions to the Fundamental Law (Transitional Provisions) to constitutional review proceedings. In its Decision No. 45/2012. (XII. 29.), the Constitutional Court followed its previous case-law in the sense that it examined the provisions of the Transitional Provisions in relation to invalidity under public law, The Constitutional Court had already held in its Decision No. 61/2011. (VII. 13.) that constitutional amendments may be reviewed on formal grounds, meaning that a serious violation of the rules of enactment may potentially render the adopted constitutional amendment invalid. This consequence, however, remained only a possibility in 2011. A revolutionary innovation of Decision No. 45/2012. (XII. 29.) was that it gave effect of the Constitutional Court’s competence to review constitutional amendments on procedural grounds and annulled the Transitional Provisions. The most significant principles laid down in the decision can be summarized as follows: 16 Dániel Karsai considered that a serious violation of the constitutionality of the legislation had taken place, and, with this decision, the Constitutional Court made the future possibility of establishing, from a constitutional point of view, invalidity under public law impossible (as we have seen, he was wrong). Karsai, Dániel, Rekviem a kôzjogi érvénytelenségért [Requiem for invalidity under public law], Fundamentum 1 (2013), 84-89. Also according to Timea Drinöczi, by this decision, the Constitutional Court very narrowly limited the possibility of establishing invalidity under public law. In Drinóczi, Tímea, Az alkotmányos párbeszéd. A többszint alkotmányosság alkotmánytana és gyakorlata a 21. században [Constitutional dialogue. The constitutional theory and practice of multilevel constitutionality in the 21st century], MTA TK JTI electronic monograph series, vol. 1., Budapest, MTA TK JTI, 2017, 287-290. + 424 +
