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ISTVÁN STUMPE
Procedure directly applicable to the case manifestly violated. Consequently, the
Constitutional Court did not establish invalidity under public law, and it rejected
the motions to that effect.’
Nevertheless, as a constitutional requirement, it stated only in the reasoning
that the legislative procedure must comply with the provisions laid down in
the Rules of Procedure, and that, even in the event of uncertainty as to the
interpretation of the provisions of the Rules of Procedure, thus of the provisions
relating to the exceptional rules for extraordinary meetings, as a precondition for
the exercise of the rights of the members of parliament, sufficient time should be
allowed for thorough scrutiny and discussion in the meetings of committees and
in a plenary meeting.
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
— EXTENDED INVALIDITY UNDER PUBLIC LAW
Upon the initiative of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, the Constitutional
Court subjected the Transitional Provisions to the Fundamental Law (Transitional
Provisions) to constitutional review proceedings. In its Decision No. 45/2012. (XII.
29.), the Constitutional Court followed its previous case-law in the sense that it
examined the provisions of the Transitional Provisions in relation to invalidity
under public law, The Constitutional Court had already held in its Decision No.
61/2011. (VII. 13.) that constitutional amendments may be reviewed on formal
grounds, meaning that a serious violation of the rules of enactment may potentially
render the adopted constitutional amendment invalid. This consequence, however,
remained only a possibility in 2011. A revolutionary innovation of Decision No.
45/2012. (XII. 29.) was that it gave effect of the Constitutional Court’s competence
to review constitutional amendments on procedural grounds and annulled the
Transitional Provisions. The most significant principles laid down in the decision
can be summarized as follows:
16 Dániel Karsai considered that a serious violation of the constitutionality of the legislation had
taken place, and, with this decision, the Constitutional Court made the future possibility of
establishing, from a constitutional point of view, invalidity under public law impossible (as
we have seen, he was wrong). Karsai, Dániel, Rekviem a kôzjogi érvénytelenségért [Requiem
for invalidity under public law], Fundamentum 1 (2013), 84-89. Also according to Timea
Drinöczi, by this decision, the Constitutional Court very narrowly limited the possibility
of establishing invalidity under public law. In Drinóczi, Tímea, Az alkotmányos párbeszéd.
A többszint alkotmányosság alkotmánytana és gyakorlata a 21. században [Constitutional
dialogue. The constitutional theory and practice of multilevel constitutionality in the 21st
century], MTA TK JTI electronic monograph series, vol. 1., Budapest, MTA TK JTI, 2017,
287-290.
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