OCR
CSILLA LEHOCZKY-KOLLONAY 1996. Its two paragraphs protect against two different kinds of human rights violation, linked to that time idea of "dignity". Paragraph 1 protects against sexual harassment — signalling that sexual harassment was considered separate from sex-discrimination.” Paragraph 2 aimed at protection from hostile working environment directed against an individual, based on any specific characteristic of a person. This was named “moral harassment” along French terminology, “mobbing” or “bullying” would be the closest in present day English terms. Beyond this novelty its provisions brought another type of progress: making protection against harassment a responsibility of the employer — confirming the shift from earlier times when workplace harassment was considered merely personal misbehaviour, beyond the responsibility of the employer and actionable as a private lawsuit against the offender. Article 26 has been criticized for its limited scope, protecting only nonmaterial rights, while it should cover fundamental “material” workplace rights (e.g. fair wage, reasonable working time) as well.'® So far altogether two collective complaints were submitted under Article 26§2, both on conscientious objection to certain tasks. In the context of military service the complaint was considered a freedom of occupation (Art 1$2) issue, not implying harassment.’ The other case”° — connected to objection for conscientious reason to termination of pregnancy and related examination — the only decision so far when the Committee found violation of Article 26$2 - is significant regarding the allocation of responsibility for the effective protection against harassment. In the complaint against Italy, claiming that under the law permitting conscientious objection to health personnel, those doctors who not objected to perform abortion had been confronted with isolation at work and often needed to carry out abortions alone amounting to a form of harassment. Even if the Committee found the statements by the doctors largely anecdotal and therefore insufficient to ground a violation ofthe Social Charter, considering the obligations imposed on the State by Article 26$2 to take preventative action to ensure moral harassment does not occur in situations where it is likely, it found the failure of the Government to take any such action amounted to a violation of Article 26§2.”! In that time thinking the “unwanted conduct” (harassment) could mean also more favourable treatment, opposite of discrimination. 18 Barbara Kresal, Article 1 - Human Dignity, in Filip Dorssemont — Klaus Lörcher - Stefan Clauwaert — Mélanie Schmitt (eds.), The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Employment Relation, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2019, 191-208, 197. 1 European Organisation of Military Associations and Trade Unions (EUROMIL) v. Ireland Complaint (No.164/2018, 21 October 2020) §35. 20 Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) v. Italy Complaint No. 91/2013 2° Ibid. $297. + 316 +