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ELSPETH GUILD to die. Ihe communication calls the EU policy of this period one of deterrence as an organisational policy. Ihe policy was to stop saving lives in the Mediterranean and thereby ‘deter’ people from leaving Libya in unsafe conditions. By failing to replace the Mare Nostrum programme and providing only very inadequate search and rescue coverage, the EU policy according to the communication, EU and Member State officials were knowingly engaging in a policy which would result in more deaths at sea, which indeed was what happened (communication section 1.3.1). The communication cites statements of ministers, EU officials and the Frontex Tactical Focused Assessment (January 2015) justifying their actions, in full knowledge of the consequences in terms of risk to lives.! All ships have a duty to carry out search and rescue operations in accordance with international law.“ But as Italy, Malta and the EU generally withdrew from state organised search and rescue, the private sector also drew back for the responsibility on account of the financial consequences. The communication cites public statements by the European Community Shipowners Association and the International Chamber of Shipping (para 88). After the tragic week in April 2015 when 1,200 people drowned between Libya and Italy, the EU moved to a new approach establishing a military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR) with the mission of “disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean.”(Operation Sophia).!? The operation was planned to take place in three stages — first support in the detection and monitoring of migration networks and patrolling the high seas; secondly, boarding, searching, seizing and diverting on the high seas vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling. The extension of these operations to the territorial waters of Libya was foreseen, depending on a UN Security Council Resolution authorising this (which was not forthcoming see below) or with the consent of the Libyan authorities (also not forthcoming). The third stage (which has never been made operational) was intended to consist of taking all necessary measures against a vessel or related 13 Para 77 Communication: cited from Frontex 2015: Tactical Focused Assessment: “The end of Operation Mare Nostrum on 31 December 2014 will have a direct impact on the JO Triton 2014. The fact that most interceptions and rescue missions will only take place inside the operational area could become a deterrence for the facilitation networks and migrants that can only depart from the Libyan or Egyptian coast with favourable weather conditions and taking into account that the boat must now navigate for several days before being rescued or intercepted.” 4 Violeta Moreno-Lax, Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a Fragmentary Reading of EU Member States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea, International Journal of Refugee Law 23 (2011), 174-220. 15 Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015, Article 2. +80 +
